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ABSTRACT 
 
 The last decade has seen a dramatic increase in the number, frequency, and scope of 
cyberattacks, both in the United States and abroad.  This upward trend necessitates that a 
significant aspect of any organization’s information systems strategy involves having a strong 
cybersecurity profile.  Inherent in such a posture is the need to have IT managers who are experts 
in their field and who are willing and able to employ best practices and educate their users.  
Furthermore, IT managers need to have awareness of the technology landscape in and around 
their organizations.  After many years of cybersecurity research, large corporations have come to 
implicitly understand these factors and, as such, have invested heavily in both technology and 
specialized personnel with the express aim of increasing their cybersecurity capabilities.  
However, large institutions are comprised of smaller organizational units, which are not always 
adequately considered when examining the cybersecurity profile of the organization.  This 
oversight is particularly true of colleges and universities where IT managers who are not 
affiliated with the institution’s central IT department employ their own information security 
strategies.  Such strategies may or may not represent a threat to the institution’s overall level of 
cybersecurity readiness.  Therefore, this research examines the responses of workgroup IT 
managers who are employed at the school or department level at institutions of higher learning 
within the United States to determine their perceptions of their cybersecurity readiness.  The 
conceptual model that is developed in this study is referred to as the Practice and Awareness 
Cybersecurity Readiness Model (PACRM).  It examines the relationships between an IT 
 iv 
manager’s perceived readiness to detect, prevent, and recover from a cyberattack, and four base 
factors.  Among the factors studied are the manager’s previous level of experience in 
cybersecurity, the extent of the manager’s use of best practices, the manager’s awareness of the 
network infrastructure in and around the organizational unit, and the degree to which the 
manager’s supported user community is educated on topics related to information security.  First, 
a survey instrument is proposed and validated. Then, a Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) is 
conducted to examine the relationships between the observed variables and the underlying 
theoretical constructs.  Finally, the model is tested using path analysis.  The validated instrument 
will have obvious implications for both cybersecurity researchers and managers.  Not only will it 
be available to other researchers, it will also provide a metric by which practitioners can gauge 
their perceptions of their cybersecurity readiness.  In addition, if the underlying model is found 
to have been correctly specified, it will provide a theoretical foundation on which to base future 
research that is not dependent on threats and deterrents but rather on raising the self-efficacy of 
the human resource. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Cybersecurity Today 
We are now treated to almost daily accounts of some new cyber or ransom ware attack.  
Each intrusion that we read about in the morning paper, such as the recent cyberattack against 
Equifax, endangers the personal information of hundreds of millions of individuals (Bernard, et 
al., 2017).  In some cases, the ability of life-saving institutions to function at full capacity is 
threatened, thereby endangering human lives (Barts Health NHS Trust, 2017).  Due to the 
enormity and rapid deployment of today’s cyber and ransom ware attacks, it can be difficult to 
come to terms with what, if anything, can be done to stop the seemingly endless tide of such 
events. 
In addition to the Equifax data breach, a major recent event was the global ransomware 
known as the WannaCry virus, which swept across the globe in a matter of hours paralyzing 
computers in approximately 150 countries (Sanger, Chan, & Scott, 2017).  Other recent 
cyberattacks, although less publicized than the WannaCry attack, have run the gamut from the 
mundane to the bizarre (Perlroth & Haag, 2017; Rosenberg & Salam, 2017).  These incidents all 
clearly demonstrate that cyber and ransom ware attacks are increasing worldwide in frequency, 
scope, and severity.  This trend is driven by the relative ease with which hackers can now launch 
a world-wide cyber attack; a trend that has been made possible by the confluence of new and 
widely-available tools, which have combined to make cyber and ransom ware attacks both easy 
and profitable.  As Nicole Perlroth notes in her New York Times article entitled, “With New 
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Digital Tools, Even Nonexperts Can Wage Cyberattacks,” the advent of digital currencies 
like BitCoin, together with the proliferation and adoption of new and powerful encryption 
software, have made it increasingly easy for would-be thieves to wage cyber and ransom ware 
warfare.  Perlroth notes, for example, that the WannaCry attack, which started in Europe on the 
afternoon of May 12, 2017, was an escalation of recent previous episodes, which exploited the 
same Microsoft Windows vulnerability that was first discovered by the National Security 
Agency (N.S.A.) of the United States.  The exploit became available to hackers in April, 2017 
when a group called the “Shadow Brokers” targeted the N.S.A. and made away with several of 
the agency’s own hacking tools.  One of those tools, code-named EternalBlue, formed the basis 
for the WannaCry ransom ware.  Microsoft Windows is the operating system of choice for 
approximately 80% of the world’s desktop computers.  Even though Microsoft had been warned 
by the N.S.A. prior to May, 2017 that the exploit had been exposed and was available to hackers, 
and Microsoft had in turn released a security patch to close the exploit, enough computers were 
left exposed that the WannaCry ransom ware was able to encrypt the computers of more than 
70,000 organizations before it was stopped (Perlroth, 2017b).  Perlroth further notes that several 
of the Bitcoin accounts associated with the ransom ware received the equivalent of $33,000 
American dollars by May 13, 2017 for an attack, which had begun the previous afternoon.  By 
the following Monday, the Bitcoin payments totaled just under $60,000 (Lohr & Alderman, 
2017). 
Fortunately, cybersecurity specialists are as qualified and motivated as hackers are.  Take, 
for example, the story of the young cybersecurity expert who worked from his bedroom flat in 
England to stem the tide of the WannaCry attack.  Marcus Hutchins, a 22-year old English tech 
worker who works for the Los Angeles-based security firm Kryptos Logic, was analyzing a 
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sample of the malicious code that made up the WannaCry virus when he noticed that the code 
referenced an unregistered web domain.  He promptly registered the domain, which helped to 
slow the spread of the attack.  The CEO of Kryptos Logic, Salim Neino, credits Hutchins with 
slowing the virus on Friday afternoon European time before it could infect computers in the 
United States.  Neino was effusive in his praise of Hutchins’ work, stating that, “Marcus, with 
the program he runs at Krypto Logic, not only saved the United States but also prevented further 
damage to the rest of the world” (The Associated Press, 2017).  Later, a kill switch was created 
by Matthieu Suiche, another cyber security researcher, to stop the virus (Perlroth, Scott, & 
Frenkel, 2017).  Hutchins and Suiche are part of a global network of security specialists who 
watch for cyber threats to emerge and work to thwart them.  Those specialists are part of a global 
industry that, it is estimated, will spend over $120 billion in 2017, up from just $3.5 billion in 
2004.  That growth is projected to continue at twelve to fifteen percent annually for the next five 
years (The Associated Press, 2017).  Such resources will be increasingly important, since the 
WannaCry ransom ware attack by no means represents the zenith of the worldwide cyber and 
ransom ware threat. 
Indeed, many cybersecurity specialists believe that we are already seeing the next evolution 
of attacks based on the tools that were stolen from the N.S.A.  On April 29, 2017, a cyberattack 
hit the IDT corporation.  That company’s global chief information officer is a cyber security 
specialist by the name of Golan Ben-Oni.  That attack presented itself as a ransom ware attack. 
However, further analysis indicated that the ransom ware was simply a mask to cover the 
deployment of a second tool, which had also been stolen from the N.S.A. earlier in the month.  
The tool, which is code-named DoublePulsar, allows hackers to insert malicious code into the 
kernel of a computer’s operating system, effectively bypassing many standard cyber security 
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measures.  In the intervening months since the attack, Mr. Ben-Oni stated that he has spoken 
with over a hundred security experts in all facets of the industry, including chief executives of 
nearly every major security company as well as the heads of intelligence at Google, Microsoft, 
and Amazon.  Of those firms, only Amazon had found traces of a residual probing effort by the 
same computer that hit IDT.  DoublePulsar represents a new and pervasive level of cyber threat.  
Sean Dillon, an analyst at RiskSense, a New Mexico-based cyber security firm, tested all major 
antivirus products against the DoublePulsar hack and found that 99% of the them failed to detect 
it (Perlroth, 2017a). 
A second large-scale cyberattack hit the Ukraine on June 27, 2017 and immediately spread 
internationally.  It used the same Microsoft Windows exploit, EternalBlue, that the WannaCry 
ransom ware attack used.  The more recent attack, however, was more encompassing in that it 
worked by encrypting the entire hard drive of the computer, whereas the WannaCry virus 
targeted only individual files and directories.  The attack crippled ATM machines in Kiev and 
radiation monitoring stations at Chernobyl where workers were forced to monitor radiation levels 
manually.  In the United States, hospitals in two cities in Pennsylvania were forced to 
temporarily shut down operations after the attack affected computers at Heritage Valley Health 
Systems, a Pennsylvania health care provider.  The attack spread through both the Microsoft 
Windows exploit and through stealing users’ credentials in much the same way as the attack on 
IDT did.  This means that even computers that had the latest Microsoft patch might have been 
vulnerable to infection.  In this way, the attack shared many similarities with a virus that 
emerged last year called Petya.  Petya, which translates to “Little Peter” in Russian, was 
available for sale on the “Dark Web” where it was sold as “ransom ware as a service,” a play on 
Silicon Valley’s business model of software-as-a-service (SaaS).  This made it difficult to trace 
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the individuals responsible for the attack.  It is relatively easy, for example, for purchasers of the 
service to encrypt victims’ computers and demand a ransom, which the creators of the original 
Petya virus then receive a portion of (Perlroth, Scott, & Frenkel, 2017). 
1.2 Cybersecurity: History and Definitions 
The first known usage of the term cybersecurity was in 1989.  It is simply defined as, “any 
measures taken to protect a computer or computer system against unauthorized access or attack” 
(Merriam-Webster, 2017).  Information security, or computer security, however, describes a 
concept that emerged with the development of the first mainframe computers in the 1960s.  In 
June 1967, researchers at the Department of Defense Advanced Research and Projects Agency 
(ARPA) began meeting regularly to discuss security of classified information.  The group was 
made official in October 1967 and was immediately tasked with formulating recommendations 
(Whitman & Mattord, 2016).  Those recommendations formed the basis for the Rand Report R-
609, which was later declassified in 1979 under the title Rand Report R-609-1.  Rand Report R-
609-1 became the first widely accepted document to identify management and policy issues 
surrounding information and computer security (Ware, 1979). 
Research into the subject of computer security continued throughout the 1970s.  However, 
with the migration of computers out of the controlled and physically isolated mainframe 
environments and into the organization, research into computer security took on a new urgency. 
As such, there was a movement during the latter half of the 1980s to redefine what information 
security meant (Brancheau & Wetherbe, 1987).  A slightly more comprehensive definition, 
therefore, may be found in a 1988 treatise on building a secure computer system.  The author 
states that information security is, “the protection of computer systems against the theft or 
damage to their hardware, software, or information, as well as from disruption or misdirection of 
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the services they provide” (Gasser, 1988).  Information security, within this context, involves 
controlling access to the physical hardware of the computer as well as protecting against threats 
that may originate from outside the physical infrastructure; through the manipulation of network 
access, for instance. 
1.3 Problem Statement 
According to a recent survey of Chief Information Officers (CIOs), organizational 
information security is at the forefront of their management concerns (Grant Thornton, 2016). 
Despite this fact, however, and despite a spate of security management research that focuses on 
commercial organizations, there seems to be a relative absence of applicable research as it 
pertains to complex, multi-tiered organizations such as colleges and universities.  Studies that 
specifically examine the link between cybersecurity and higher education seem to be limited to 
just a few, which took place primarily in the decade between 2000 and 2010. (Elliott et al., 1991; 
Rezgui & Marks, 2008; Tout et al., 2009; Oblinger & Hawkins, 2006).  This lack of recent 
inquiry persists despite evidence that institutions of higher learning are experiencing 
cyberattacks with increased frequency (Rezgui & Marks, 2008). 
Research into the cybersecurity readiness of colleges and universities is complicated by the 
distributed nature of IT administration at such institutions.  While much of the responsibility for 
the management of an institution falls under the purview of the central IT department, numerous 
responsibilities still reside within individual schools and departments.  The men and women who 
shoulder these responsibilities often work outside of the central department.  As such, it follows 
that they neither share in the department’s resources nor in its organizational hierarchy.  The 
actions of such school and department level managers may represent an uncontrolled variable in 
the organization’s cybersecurity profile, which in turn presents a potential avenue of exploitation 
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for individuals who are intent on gaining unauthorized access to that institution’s information 
resources.  For these and other reasons, institutions of higher learning, especially at the school or 
department level, are an important, but neglected, area of inquiry in terms of information security 
research.  Since decentralized IT administration is a trait that is common to many complex, 
multi-tiered organizations, a comprehensive evaluation of the factors most associated with 
cybersecurity readiness at this level is needed.  It is the view of this project that such an 
evaluation should take place within the context of colleges and universities to address the relative 
paucity of research pertaining to that domain.  This study therefore attempts to fill that void by 
examining the behavior and perceptions of workgroup IT managers who work at the school and 
department level of colleges and universities in the United States. 
1.4 Research Questions 
We begin by asking the following research question: 
RQ1: What factors are associated with the perceived readiness of workgroup IT 
managers to detect, prevent, and if necessary, recover from a cyberattack? 
  
 By answering RQ1, this project hopes to more thoroughly address the topic of 
cybersecurity readiness in complex, multi-tiered organizations.  From a comprehensive review of 
the relevant information security research, it was hypothesized that four distinct groups of factors 
help to inform an IT manager’s perceived cybersecurity readiness.  These four factors are: the 
manager’s previous level of experience with cybersecurity, the extent of his or her use of known 
best practices, his or her perceived awareness of several factors related to the network and 
computer infrastructure, and the degree to which the user community that he or she supports is 
educated about issues related to information security.  Therefore, a subset of research questions 
related to RQ1 is:  
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RQ1a: How is an IT manager’s previous level of cybersecurity experience related to his 
or her perceived readiness to detect, prevent, and recover from a cyberattack?  
 
RQ1b: How is the extent of an IT manager’s use of cybersecurity best practices related to 
his or her perceived readiness to detect, prevent, and recover from a cyberattack? 
 
RQ1c: How is an IT manager’s awareness of the network environment in and around the 
organizational unit related to his or her perceived readiness to detect, prevent, and 
recover from a cyberattack?  
 
RQ1d: How is the degree to which the user community is educated about issues 
pertaining to information security related to the IT manager’s perceived readiness 
to detect, prevent, and recover from a cyberattack? 
 
 Finally, a manager’s attitude toward risk should be also be considered when evaluating 
the extent of his or her use of best practices.  Therefore, 
RQ2: Does attitude towards risk affect the relationship between an IT manager’s 
previous level of experience and the extent of his or her use of cybersecurity best 
practices? 
  
To answer these research questions, the following theoretical model was developed.  It will 
be described and validated throughout the remainder of this dissertation. 
1.5 PACRM Theoretical Model  
This project develops and evaluates a model, which links the four factors listed above with 
the IT manager’s perceived readiness to detect, prevent, and recover from a cyberattack.  The 
model is illustrated below in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1: PACRM Conceptual Model Diagram 
Level of Previous Experience with Cybersecurity is a summative measure, which is 
composed of three distinct variables.  The first variable is the amount of time that the manager 
has spent engaged in cyberattack detection and prevention training.  This variable is combined 
with the manager’s self-reported levels of experience with stopping and initiating cyberattacks.  
This factor is thought to be related to the Extent of Use factors, which capture the manager’s use 
of network activity monitoring mechanisms, the extent of control over physical access to 
computer and network resources, the use of software preventative measures, and the use of a 
backup policy where backups are kept offline.  Next, the Perceived Awareness factors capture 
the manager’s knowledge and awareness of the immediate threat environment, the perceived 
vulnerabilities in the physical network infrastructure, and the defensive measures currently in 
place to protect against intrusion.  Third, the Degree of User Community Awareness of Security 
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Issues factor represents the IT manager’s perception of the degree to which the user community 
that he or she supports is educated about issues related to information security.  Finally, the 
manager’s attitude towards risk, as denoted by a risk avoidance measure, moderates the 
relationship between his or her previous level of experience with cybersecurity and the extent of 
his or her use of best practices. 
1.6 Review of Methodology 
To test the PACRM theoretical model in Figure 1, it is first necessary to develop a survey 
instrument that can be administered to the appropriate managers.  Since the instrument is new, it 
must first undergo a process of instrument validation.  The final survey instrument is included as 
Appendix C of this document. 
The validation of the PACRM measurement instrument will be conducted in three stages.  
Stages 1 and 2 comprise the pilot test phase while stage 3 represents the roll-out phase.  Stage 1 
will consist of qualitative interviews with several IT managers at a large, public university in the 
southeastern United States.  Researcher notes of each of the interviews will be collected and the 
answers correlated to establish relevant content validity.  The interviewees will then be 
administered the PACRM survey on paper and encouraged to “think aloud” as they record their 
answers.  This is an effort to begin establishing the construct validity of the proposed instrument 
by noting which questions pose a difficulty for the participants. 
Stage 2 will consist of the revised survey being administered as a web-based, Qualtrics study 
to IT managers working at colleges and universities throughout the southeastern United States.  
The resulting data will be analyzed, and Cronbach’s alpha statistics will be generated to test the 
reliability of the proposed instrument. 
 11 
Finally, stage 3 will comprise the roll-out phase of the instrument to workgroup IT managers 
working at institutions of higher learning throughout the United States.  Once enough responses 
are generated, a CFA will be done to see how closely the survey aligns with the theoretical 
assumptions of the underlying PACRM model.  Lastly, the proposed relationships in the model 
will be tested using a path analysis framework. 
1.7 Chapter Overview 
Chapter one provided a brief overview of the state of cybersecurity today.  It identified a 
problem in the current cybersecurity literature.  Namely, even though past and contemporary 
studies have affirmed the primacy of cybersecurity among the concerns of top organizational 
managers, the extant information security literature has not dealt extensively with organizational-
unit level analyses, such as are needed for institutions of higher learning.  Therefore, this 
dissertation argues that a new model is needed that can be applied equally as well to any 
institution that exhibits a decentralized IT organizational structure.  Chapter 1, therefore, 
introduced and briefly described the Practice and Awareness Cybersecurity Readiness Model 
(PACRM), which will be discussed and validated through the remainder of this project. 
Chapter two goes through a review of the scholastic literature pertaining to organizational 
cybersecurity.  Starting in the late 1980s and early 1990s, researchers began to look at the issue 
of organizational computer security in earnest.  Inquiry into the domain of computer security 
began with several surveys noting areas of concern among organizational managers.  These 
surveys initially ranked computer security high among managers’ concerns.  However, as the 
end-user computing revolution moved computing resources out of the mainframe environment 
and into the micro-computer and networking environments, managers struggled with how to 
conceptualize information security, and the issue moved down their list of concerns. Beginning 
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in the early 1990s, several researchers took up the mantle of researching organizational security.  
Over the course of this research, several informative conceptual models were developed and 
tested.  Goodhue and Straub (1991) developed a theory and empirical-based model, which 
looked at managers’ perceptions as a function of industry risk, the extent of organizational effort 
to control those risks, and individual factors such as awareness of previous system violations, 
and security background.  That model has many elements in common with the PACRM model 
being proposed in the present research.  Later research began to look at information security as a 
function of manager behavior.  Specifically, research that was based on the Theory of Planned 
Behavior (TPB) played a significant role in identifying factors that could shape IT managers’ 
information security intentions.  Chapter two concludes by describing the theoretical and 
empirical foundations of the variables in the PACRM model, which has determinants, like 
models before it, in General Deterrence Theory (GDT).  However, GDT-based research, which 
can end up relying heavily on technologically-driven solutions to ensure both the certainty and 
severity of sanctions, has been shown to be inadequate in some cases (Cavusoglu, Son, & 
Benbasat, 2009; Dhillon & Backhouse, 2001).  Therefore, Self-Efficacy Theory (SET) is used, in 
conjunction with general deterrence theory, to inform the remainder of the components of the 
PACRM model.   
Chapter three describes the proposed relationships between the independent factors and the 
dependent factors of the PACRM model.  Those relationships are then articulated in the form of 
propositions. 
 Chapter four discusses the proposed survey instrument in detail.  The stages of instrument 
validation are discussed, and a survey methodology is articulated.  As described above, in the 
pilot testing phase, the survey will first be administered to several IT managers who work at the 
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school or department level of several colleges and universities located in the United States.  The 
initial stage consists of qualitative interviews with several IT administrators who work at a large 
university in the southeastern United States.  These administrators ranged in years of 
professional IT work experience from 5 to 39 years.  The results of those interviews resulted in 
the inclusion of a new factor into the original model, and a new block of questions on the survey 
instrument.  In stage two of the pilot study, the survey was administered as a web-based, 
Qualtrics survey to several college and university IT administrators.  Reliability statistics were 
generated and analyzed.  Stage three consisted of a national survey of IT administrators drawn 
from the collegiate and university workgroup IT manager population.  Confirmatory factor 
analysis was used to determine the extent to which the survey instrument matched expectations 
generated from the underlying model.  Once the CFA analysis is complete, the data from stage 3 
was used to conduct a path analysis to determine whether the conceptual model adequately 
describes managers’ perceived readiness to detect, prevent, and recover from a cyberattack. 
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2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
  
In a recent survey of 210 security professionals by a leading security platform provider, it 
was found that, on average, ten percent of security personnel admitted to having paid a ransom or 
having hid a security breach from their associates or supervisors to protect their jobs (Bromium, 
2017).  This research is in line with previous studies, which found that insiders, a term that has 
been used to describe employees who are authorized to use organizational systems, facilities, or 
computer resources, may pose a risk to those organizations’ computer security (Neumann, 1999; 
Warkentin & Willison, 2009).  In addition, previous studies have found that deliberate acts, such 
as those described above, can significantly impact information security (Lee & Lee, 2002; Lee et 
al., 2004). 
2.1 The Rising Importance of Information Security 
Research studies that documented threats to computer systems began in earnest as early 
as the mid-1970s and have continued through the present day (Parker, 1976, 1981, 1983; Loch, 
Carr, & Warkentin, 1992; Whitman, 2004).  Early high profile studies and reports primarily 
documented threats against the U.S. government (Colton et al., 1982; Kusserow, 1983).  
However, it did not take long for researchers and executives to recognize the significance of 
information security to businesses.  In the mid-1980s, researchers working out of the University 
of Minnesota began exploring the issues of greatest concern to information systems executives 
and corporate managers (Dickson, et al., 1984; Brancheau & Wetherbe, 1987).  They found that
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strategic planning and using computers for competitive advantage were at the forefront of 
executives’ minds.  Organizational learning and IS’s role and contribution to the organization 
were also among their concerns, foreshadowing the increasing importance of End-User 
Computing (EUC) to organizations.  The rising importance of information security, however, can 
be seen in such studies by the relative value that executives placed on data as a corporate 
resource (Brancheau & Wetherbe, 1987). 
The Brancheau and Wetherbe (1987) study is particularly interesting both in terms of its 
survey method and its results.  Previous studies (Ball & Harris, 1982; Hartog & Herbert, 1986) 
had found that information security ranked much higher among the member populations they 
studied.  The relative discrepancy in rankings between the studies is likely an artifact of the 
survey methods the researchers used and the populations they studied.  For instance, in their 
survey, Hartog & Herbert employed a single-round cross-sectional approach while Brancheau 
and Wetherbe used a three-round Delphi study.  It is important to note that the issue of computer 
security would come to much rank higher in subsequent studies of the kind (Brancheau, Janz & 
Wetherbe, 1996; Ransbotham & Mitra, 2009).  Brancheau & Weatherbe acknowledge this 
possibility in 1987 when they remark in their closing statements that, “While it is useful to make 
a periodic assessment of what IS professionals feel are the profession’s most critical issues, it is 
often the less obvious problems that become major concerns.” 
2.2 General Deterrence Theory-based Research 
 The veracity of that statement was already beginning to assert itself within just a few 
short years.  Detmar Straub, a researcher who was also working out of the University of 
Minnesota at the time, began to argue for the importance of information security as early as 
1990.  Based on research he had done previously (Hoffer & Straub, 1989; Straub & Hoffer, 
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1987), it was apparent to Straub that organizations were not giving the issue of information 
security the requisite attention he felt it deserved, despite the stated importance of data as a 
corporate resource.  In response, Straub undertook research that looked at information security 
from the perspective of General Deterrence Theory (GDT) (Straub D. W., 1990).  His research 
indicated that investment in IS research could significantly reduce incidents of computer abuse 
by advocating for the use of countermeasures, which included administrative policies aimed at 
deterrence. Straub’s data also showed that data security activities, which he defined as electronic 
security measures, were integral to decreasing the number of incidences of computer abuse 
within the organizations that he surveyed. 
 The applicability of security countermeasures for reducing incidents of computer abuse 
had been studied in the Information Systems literature prior to Straub’s research (Madnick, 
1978).  However, Straub’s aim was to not only to determine if IS deterrence was effective in 
reducing incidences of computer abuse, but also to determine if rival explanations, such as the 
use of security software, could explain lower incident rates of computer abuse (Straub D. W., 
1990).  In order to do so, he defined computer abuse in the traditional vein (Kling, 1980) as 
abuse perpetuated by individuals against organizations.  Straub articulated that abuse could occur 
in this context as hardware abuse, software abuse, data abuse, and computer service abuse 
(1990).  These four aspects of information security would later form the basis for many 
cybersecurity related protocols and frameworks such as COBIT 5, ISA 62443-2-1:2009, 
ISO/IEC 27001:2013, and NIST SP 800-53 Rev.4 (NIST, 2014).  In addition, Straub’s research 
represents one of the first empirical studies to validate the effectiveness of security software in 
preventing incidents of computer abuse. 
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Later that same year, Straub and another researcher co-authored a study, which addressed 
the way in which IS security managers uncovered incidences of computer abuse and disciplined 
computer abusers (Straub & Nance, 1990).  The authors’ goal for the project was to develop a 
way of assessing the risks that organizations face as well as the measures being taken by 
organizations to detect computer abuse and discipline abusers.  A by-product of this research was 
to identify information security managers’ contemporary responses to computer abuse and to 
determine factors that could help those managers reduce incidents of computer crime.   
Previous research (Straub, 1986) had found that two classes of counter measures – 
deterrents and preventatives – were shown to be successful in reducing incidents of computer 
abuse.  Deterrents, as defined by the author, passively restrict the use of computer resources and 
include actions such as computer security training sessions and policy statements.  Preventatives, 
on the other hand, are those actions that actively restrict the use of computer resources.  These 
may include things like physical barriers to locations where sensitive data or computer resources 
are kept and software solutions such as firewalls and passwords.  Detection is another important 
component of deterrence.  Parker (1981) defined detection as the intentional investigation of 
system activity in order to identify irregularities.  The principle would later find application in 
Dorothy E. Denning’s work on Intrusion Detection Systems (1987).  Straub and Nance found 
that incidents of computer abuse were discovered in three general ways; through accidental 
discovery, normal system controls, and purposeful investigation.  The incidents that were 
identified from their survey were overwhelmingly discovered by accident, or through normal 
system controls (1990).  Sadly, detection of extant threats through purposeful investigation 
remains the most challenging aspect of cybersecurity to this day. 
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Goodhue & Straub (1991) looked at ways in which managers could develop a sense for 
the proper balance between exposing their department to unnecessary risk and the cost associated 
with preventative measures.  The authors argued that managerial concern over organizational 
security is a function of the risk that is inherent in the industry, the extent to which the 
organization has controlled for these risks, and the factors that are associated with the individual 
managers, such as their awareness of previous systems violations and their level of experience in 
performing systems control work.  Goodhue and Straub’s model is shown in Figure 2 below. 
 
Figure 2: Managerial Perceptions of Security Risk (Goodhue & Straub, 1991) 
Several elements from Goodhue’s and Straub’s model have correlations in the PACRM 
model being proposed herein.  The second and third components, “IS Environment” and 
“Individual Characteristics,” in particular, are both related to elements of the proposed model 
that is described below in Chapter 3.  As stated by Goodhue and Straub, the “IS Environment” 
construct reflects managers’ current understanding of the type of technical and managerial 
controls that can be used to secure information systems.  The “Individual Characteristics” 
component, meanwhile, describes how well informed managers are about the number and types 
of local security incidents and the susceptibility of their systems to damage (Goodhue & Straub, 
1991).  As their research showed, both factors are informative in determining managers’ concern 
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about systems risk.  In fact, independent corroboration of Goodhue & Straub’s proposed 
relationships was reported shortly after the paper was originally published (Dixon, Marston, & 
Collier, 1992).  However, both constructs were designed to be very high level in how they 
assessed individual managers’ awareness/knowledge.  Neither factor addressed specific areas of 
concern to IT managers.  In addition, Goodhue & Straub’s research was designed to measure 
manager perceptions at the executive level.  As such, their model has the implicit assumption 
that managerial concerns about IS security are only relevant at the institutional level.  Such 
research is unquestionably valid.  However, as stated in the introduction, the present research 
addresses the perceptions of IT managers at the decentralized level of administration.  This is 
important because measuring manager perceptions at this lower level of IT administration has 
important ramifications for the cybersecurity profile of the institution as a whole. 
In 1998, Straub and Richard Welke collaborated to test their Security Action Cycle 
(SAC) model using qualitative data that they obtained from two Fortune 500 firms.  Previous 
research had emphasized four distinct categories related to information security.  These 
categories were deterrence, prevention, detection, and recovery (Forcht, 1984; Parker, 1981).  
Straub and Welke’s model looked at a possible method of deterrence feedback, based on a series 
of sequential actions that managers could take.  These actions ranged from deterrence to 
remediation (Straub & Welke, 1998).  While informative, the model is primarily concerned with 
reinforcing the two central tenets of general deterrence theory, which are the certainty and 
severity of punitive actions to deter abusive behavior.  However, GDT-based solutions, like the 
ones presented above, while arguably the dominant framework for security research throughout 
the 1990s, do not represent the sum total of information security research.   
 20 
In fact, there have been several recent critiques of GDT-based research.  In 2011, 
researchers sought to understand the relationship between the punishment of Information 
Security Policy (ISP) breaches by insiders and the perceived justice of those punishments (Xue, 
Liang, & Wu, 2011).  They found that the intention to comply with the organization’s security 
policy is strongly related to the perceived justice of punishment, which in turn is negatively 
affected by actual punishment.  Because punishment serves to enforce the two key tenets of 
general deterrence theory, as articulated in Straub’s original article (1990), Xue et al.’s findings 
represent a significant repudiation of the effectiveness of GDT-based solutions.  Additional 
research has examined the role that computer monitoring plays on attributed trust (Posey, 
Bennett, & Roberts, 2011).  Attributed trust is the insider’s perception that the organization trusts 
them. The authors found that low attributed trust drives incidents of computer abuse.  Likewise, 
it has been found that security related stress (SRS) from security controls may adversely affect 
moral engagement among employees and, in turn, lead to increased incidents of computer abuse 
(D'Arcy, Herath, & Shoss, 2014).  While GDT-based studies may no longer be at the pinnacle of 
insider threat research, they do represent an important foundational step for subsequent research 
that looked at these issues (Mitnick & Simon, 2002; Warkentin & Willison, 2009).  However, to 
go further, information security research had to evolve beyond simple deterrence to begin to 
address individual intention as well. 
2.3 Theory of Planned Behavior-based Research 
In 2010, researchers from the University of British Columbia continued the examination 
of employee behavior regarding information security by also looking at employee compliance 
with ISPs.  Rather than adopting a GDT perspective, however, they did so from the vantage point 
of the Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB) (Ajzen, 1991).  TPB postulates that an individual’s 
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intention to perform various kinds of behaviors can be predicted by his or her attitudes towards 
the behavior, subjective norms, and perceived behavioral control, which are all original aspects 
of the Theory of Reasoned Action (TRA) (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975).  
TPB further stipulates that behaviors can be explained through behavioral beliefs, normative 
beliefs, and self-efficacy, which serve as antecedents to attitudes, subjective norms, and 
behavioral control (Bulgurcu, Cavusoglu, & Benbasat, 2010).   
A good example of information security research that is based on TPB is Bulgurcu et al.’s 
article, which postulated that employees’ intention to comply with their organization’s ISP is 
influenced by three factors:  attitude towards compliance, normative beliefs, and self-efficacy 
(2010).  In that article, the authors researched the role that the employee’s information security 
awareness plays in shaping his or her attitude toward compliance.  They postulated that it 
influences his or her beliefs over the outcome as well as his or her attitude toward compliance.  
In turn,  his or her attitude towards compliance informs his or her intention to comply with the 
organization’s ISP.  Bulgurcu et al.’s model is informative.  However, one area of concern with 
respect to their model is that  “Information Security Awareness” is comprised only of the 
manager’s awareness of the organization’s ISP and the manager’s general security awareness.  
As with Goodhue & Straub’s model from Figure 2 above, the constructs are not grounded in 
specific areas of concern to IT managers.  While it was not the authors’ intention to incorporate 
specific areas of awareness, other than ISP awareness, into their model, it is nonetheless an area 
that this dissertation seeks to address. 
In 2009, Dinev et al. (2009) also looked at user behavior and attitudes towards protective 
information technologies from a TPB perspective.  They posited that cultural differences 
moderate the strength of the relationship in the traditional behavioral model within the context of 
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these technologies.  Specifically, they found a moderating effect when they examined data from 
two divergent cultures, the United States and South Korea.  The authors argue that their findings 
indicate that cultural differences need to be taken into account when designing certain classes of 
protective technologies such as spyware-detection software. 
2.4 Research with other Theoretical Orientations 
Boss & Kirsch (2007) looked at ways to motivate employees to follow corporate security 
guidelines by adopting an organizational lens approach.  In their paper, the authors introduce the 
concept of “mandatoriness,” which they define as the degree to which employees perceive that 
compliance with the organization’s information security guideliness is expected, or mandatory.  
They found that through the specification of policies and evaluation of employee behavior, firms 
can be effective in convincing their employees that security policies are mandatory, and that 
compliance, therefore, is compulsory.  In turn, the perception of mandatoriness among 
employees is effective in motivating them to adopt security practices.  Although presented as a 
novel concept, “mandatoriness” has much in common with the theoretical assumptions of GDT-
based perspectives.  Additional research has argued that employees’ moral reasoning and values 
affects their compliance with their organizations’ information security policy (Myyry et al., 
2009).  The authors’ theory is based on two existing theories of moral reasoning:  The Theory of 
Cognitive Moral Development and the Theory of Motivational Types of Values (Kohlberg, 
1984; Schwartz, 2007). 
Meanwhile, some information security research has focused on whether information 
security awareness actually impacts information security.  For instance, Siponen (2000) finds 
that the accepted notion of information security awareness, as a descriptive construct, is not 
sufficient for explaining factual, i.e. normative, aspects of information security.  He further 
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argues that motivation, as a recognized precursor for action, is not sufficiently considered in 
terms of information security.  In order to reconcile this problem, Siponen states that all user 
behavior that is thought to have an impact upon information security should satisfy the 
requirements of behavioral theories and provide answers to end-users about why they should 
consider information security in their daily actions.  Using this criteria, Siponen further states 
that arguments based on morals and ethics, such as those cited above, should be discarded. 
In 1992, researchers looked at twelve specific threats and identified their relative 
rankings in a survey of MIS executives in terms of three distinct computing environments; 
microcomputer, mainframe, and networking (Loch, Carr, & Warkentin, 1992).  They found that 
threats to organizations’ information security could arise from inside the organization as well as 
from outside the organization.  This marked another milestone in the cognitive shift from 
thinking of information security in terms of just physical security, where only a few 
administrators had access to isolated mainframe computers, to data security where it is necessary 
for IT administrators to safeguard networked information assets.  As evidence of this shift the 
researchers noted that computer viruses posed a growing threat to information security and, as 
such, included it in their survey. The concept of the computer virus had previously been 
described by J.A. Schweitzer (1989) and Davis and Gantenbein (1987).  By the early 1990s, the 
concept of the computer virus was already beginning to gain recognition in the information 
systems literature as a viable information security threat. 
Loch, Carr & Warkentin’s results indicated that a greater percentage of the respondents 
surveyed perceived the risk of computer disruption to be higher in the microcomputer 
environment (56%), as compared to the mainframe environment, where 62% of the respondents 
classified the risk of computer disruption to be low (Loch, Carr, & Warkentin, 1992).  Computer 
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viruses were ranked as the fourth most important threat in the network environment and sixth 
overall in the microcomputer environment.  An interesting ancillary finding of this study, which 
has significant implications for the present research, was that the “Education and Training” 
industry together with “Information Services” and “Manufacturing” comprised 68% of the 
reported verified incidences of computer viruses.  Of those three categories, by far the largest 
was the “Education and Training” industry, accounting for 60% of verified incidents of a 
computer virus (Loch, Carr, & Warkentin, 1992). 
2.5 Information Security Research in Higher Education Environments 
It was not until much later, however, that scholarly articles began to explore information 
security within the context of institutions of higher learning.  One article to do so explored 
information security readiness in higher education from the vantage point of a state-sponsored 
university in a developing country (Rezgui & Marks, 2008).  The authors of that article adopted a 
case study approach to identify the political, social, and cultural factors that adversely affected 
information security awareness at Zayed University in the United Arab Emirates.  While many of 
the authors’ conclusions are not applicable to a domestic view of institutions of higher learning 
because of strong cultural and organizational differences, it is a premise of this dissertation that 
the lack of transparency between departments, as well as complacency in monitoring behaviors, 
which Rezgui and Marks identify in their research, are also present in institutions of higher 
learning located in the United States.  In support of this observation, an EDUCAUSE study 
(Updegrove & Wishon, 2003) highlighted an apparent cybersecurity readiness gap in 435 higher 
education institutions surveyed.  This gap was made apparent by yet another article, which 
asserted that a third of higher education institutions experienced a data loss or theft during 2006, 
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with nine percent of those reporting a loss or theft of confidential student information (Piazza, 
2006).   
Cybersecurity incidents at the University of Maryland and at the North Dakota University 
system in 2014 underscore the fact that universities are not immune to cyberattack.  The first 
incident, involving one of the University of Maryland’s primary databases, resulted in the 
unauthorized exposure of more than 390,000 student and staff records.  The North Dakota 
University system experienced a similar data breach in which over 290 student and staff records 
were compromised (Ponemon Institute, L.L.C., 2014).  Such data breaches occurred even 
though, according to the Updegrove and Wishon article, 92% of institutions they surveyed 
indicated that they had an institutional ISP in place at the time of the attack.  A far more 
troubling insight from that article is that a bare majority of respondents indicated using known 
best practices.  For instance, only 57% of the respondents in their survey reported having a 
password change policy that was ninety days or less.  A relative minority, 39%, of the schools 
surveyed, indicated the presence of an IS awareness program in their institutions and only 30% 
reported using risk assessment and audit procedures (Updegrove & Wishon, 2003). 
Clearly, more can be done at the institutional level to safeguard the information resources 
of colleges and universities.  The situation is further complicated by the decentralized levels of 
IT administration at institutions of higher learning, which due to limited budgets and limited 
staff, may not be as prepared in terms of cybersecurity readiness as centralized, institution-wide 
IT departments.  The question remains then, how does the cybersecurity readiness picture at the 
decentralized department level in complex, multi-tiered organizations such as colleges and 
universities look?  Furthermore, what can be done at the organizational-unit level of such 
institutions to safeguard valuable information resources?   
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2.6 Defense in Depth Strategy 
A potential answer to the questions listed above appears in an article from the 
September/October 2000 issue of IEEE Software.  The authors of that article argue that in 
addition to normal preventative measures such as formulating a security policy, creating user 
authentication and access control lists, creating strong password requirements, and eliminating 
unnecessary services, individual network administrators should introduce an intrusion detection 
component into their network schema, as one aspect of what the authors refer to as, “defense in 
depth” (McHugh, Christie, & Allen, 2000).  Defense in depth consists, in part, of network 
sensors outside of the protected network, which allow the administrator to gain a sense for the 
general threat level around a system’s periphery, as indicated by probes and attempts that are 
detected that otherwise would have been blocked by the firewall.  As the authors state, a 
defensive posture that employs network sensors on both sides of the firewall allows the 
administrator to validate and correctly configure firewall rules. 
However, a “Defense in Depth” strategy may be beyond the financial and technical 
capabilities of individual departments, which are often forced to operate with limited staff and 
small budgets.  Furthermore, IT administrators who are employed outside of the institution’s 
centralized IT department often have their ability to effect changes like firewall configurations 
restricted by official institution policy.  Many times, such responsibilities reside solely with the 
institution’s centralized IT department.  It is the premise of this dissertation, therefore, that a 
“Defense in Depth” strategy often is not feasible at the organizational-unit level of IT 
administration in complex, multi-tiered organizations.  Therefore, a different strategy is needed.  
The proposed strategy should not solely rely on technological solutions, such as those that 
McHugh et al. propose, since such solutions are costly both in terms of purchasing and 
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implementation.  Rather, it will be far more effective to leverage existing resources to increase 
cybersecurity readiness.  One such resource, which many organizational units have, is a human 
resource in the form of one or more workgroup IT managers.   
To increase the cybersecurity readiness of such administrators, and by extension increase 
the cybersecurity readiness of the organizational unit, it is first necessary to get a baseline 
measure for the current state of cybersecurity readiness at this level of administration.  However, 
in the absence of reliable data that shows the type, frequency, and severity of cyberattacks 
against specific organizational units, such as departments and schools at institutions of higher 
learning, information security researchers must adopt an adequate proxy.  An IT manager’s 
perception of his or her cybersecurity readiness can serve as an adequate proxy for his or her 
actual cybersecurity readiness, in much the same way that an individual’s perceived capability 
for managing his or her health outcomes has been shown to correlate strongly with his or her 
actual intentions to manage personal health outcomes, as demonstrated by instruments like the 
Perceived Health Competence Scale (PHCS) (Smith, Wallston, & Smith, 1995).  This view is 
substantiated, in large part, because of the theoretical justifications of self-efficacy theory (SET), 
as laid out by Albert Bandura in his 1977 treatise, “Self-efficacy: towards a unifying theory of 
behavioral change.” 
2.7 Previous Experience with Cybersecurity 
In their article, McHugh et al. raise the valid point that cyberattacks involve multiple 
perspectives (2000).  They state that the administrator, whose responsibility it is to safeguard the 
information technology resources of the organizational unit, should be concerned with answering 
questions such as, who was affected by a cyberattack, why did it happen, what happened, and 
when and where did the intrusion occur?  The attacker, on the other hand, is concerned with 
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questions that revolve around his or her objective and its associated risk.  Such questions may 
pertain to the nature of the objective, the nature of any vulnerabilities that exist, the amount of 
damage the attack is likely to result in, the nature and severity of any consequences that may 
result from the action, and the availability and applicability of existing exploit scripts or attack 
tools.  The ability to conceptualize of a cyberattack from both viewpoints is therefore pertinent to 
a broader understanding of perceptions of cybersecurity readiness.  As discussed later in Chapter 
3, both viewpoints are incorporated into the PACRM model as part of the Level of Previous 
Experience with Cybersecurity construct, a summative measure that is comprised of the hours 
spent in cyber threat detection and prevention training, and his or her self-reported level of 
experience with stopping and initiating cyberattacks. 
2.8 Information Security: The Quest for the Dependent Variable 
The quest for a dependent variable in information security research is an ongoing process.  
In many respects, the process is complicated by the seemingly straightforward nature of 
information security.  The goal of such research is, after all, to improve information security 
within organizations by either preventing cyberattacks or otherwise mitigating their adverse 
effects.  Information security, therefore, does seem to be the logical choice as a dependent 
variable and indeed, many recent research studies have adopted information security as their 
response variable of choice (Sapegin, et al., 2017).  However, what does information security 
entail?  Widely accepted notions of information security emphasize that information should be 
confidential, available, and authentic (Whitman & Mattord, 2016).  Therefore, one possible 
definition of information security is the process by which these characteristics of an 
organization’s information resources are safeguarded from unauthorized manipulation.  To 
achieve that goal, however, it is necessary for IT managers to engage in concrete activities 
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related to safeguarding the availability, authenticity, and confidentiality of their organization’s 
information resources. It is the premise of this dissertation that these activities are predicated on 
the IT manager’s ability to detect, prevent, and, if necessary, recover from a cyberattack. 
2.9 Security Information and Event Management 
Security Event Management (SEM) and Security Information Management (SIM) are two 
aspects of Security Information and Event Management (SIEM), which relies on real-time 
monitoring and correlation of events to gauge security threats.  The monitoring of real time data 
events through the collection of log data is part of SEM, while the long-term storage and 
statistical analysis of log data is an aspect of SIM.  Not surprisingly, SIEM consists of data 
aggregation from multiple sources including network devices, security sensors, servers, and 
databases.  SIEM is incorporated into the PACRM model in Chapter 3 as the Extent of the IT 
Manager’s Use of Network Monitoring Mechanisms factor. 
2.10 Cybersecurity Best Practice Frameworks 
The Center for Internet Security (CIS) lists 20 top controls for managers to use in securing 
their information systems’ infrastructure (CIS Controls, 2017).  Among other items, included in 
that list are:  Secured configurations for hardware and software, controlled use of administrative 
privileges, maintenance, monitoring, and analysis of audit logs, malware defenses, data recovery 
capabilities, boundary defense, controlled access based on the need to know, account monitoring 
and control, and security skills assessment and appropriate training to fill the gaps (CIS Controls, 
2017).  Each of the controls listed above is represented by elements of the PACRM model, 
discussed in Chapter 3. 
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 Table 1 presents a brief synopsis of the elements associated with the Extent of Use of 
Cybersecurity Best Practices and the Degree of User Community Awareness of Security Issues 
factors from the PACRM model and their corollaries among the CIS controls. 
Table 1: PACRM Elements and their CIS Control Corollaries 
PACRM Model Element  CIS Controls Description (Center for 
Internet Security, 2017) 
Use and Routinely Monitor Network 
Activity Logs 
 Collect, manage, and analyze audit logs of 
events that could help detect, understand, or 
recover from an attack. 
Employ Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) 
and/or Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPS) 
and sensor deployments and/or traffic 
analyzers 
 Detect/prevent/correct the flow of 
information transferring networks of 
different trust levels with a focus on 
security-damaging data. 
Control unauthorized physical access to 
network and server resources through 
physical means or electronic means such as 
locking the BIOS or encryption 
 The processes and tools used to 
track/control/prevent/correct secure access to 
critical assets (e.g., information, resources, 
systems) according to the formal 
determination of which persons, computers, 
and applications have a need and right to 
access these critical assets based on an 
approved classification. 
Require Strong Passwords and Require 
Users to Update Passwords 
 Actively manage the life cycle of system and 
application accounts – their creation, use, 
dormancy, deletion – to minimize 
opportunities for attackers to leverage them. 
Run Critical Operating System or 
Application Software Updates 
 Manage the security life cycle of all in-house 
developed and acquired software to prevent, 
detect, and correct security weaknesses. 
Perform Regular System Backups with 
Backups that are Stored Offline 
 The processes and tools used to properly 
back up critical information with a proven 
methodology for timely recovery of it. 
Ensure User Community Awareness on 
Security Issues  
 For all functional roles in the organization 
(prioritizing those mission-critical to the 
business and its security), identify the 
specific knowledge, skills, and abilities 
needed to support defense of the enterprise; 
develop and execute an integrated plan to 
assess, identify gaps, and remediate through 
policy, organizational planning, training, and 
awareness programs. 
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 In addition to the Center for Internet Security guidelines listed above, there is a wide 
range of frameworks that provide guidelines for cybersecurity best practices.  Three of the most 
widely used of these frameworks are the NIST 800-14 (Swanson & Guttman, 1996), the ISO 
27000 series (International Standards Organization, 2017), and the NIST 2014 framework for 
improving critical cybersecurity infrastructure (NIST, 2014). 
 While the NIST 800-14 framework identifies many controls related to information 
security, Chapter 3 of the NIST standard is particularly relevant because it pertains to IT security 
practices.  Specifically, the sections that are most pertinent to the present discussion are 
personnel/user issues (3.5), computer security incident handling (3.7), awareness and training 
(3.8), security considerations in computer support and operations (3.9), and physical and 
environmental security (3.10).  Each of these chapter sections contain controls that are reflected 
in the PACRM model, discussed in Chapter 3 of this dissertation.  For example, section 3.7 in 
the NIST framework contains controls for an “Educated Constituency,” which is reflected in the 
Degree of User Community Awareness of Security Issues factor of the PACRM model.  
Likewise, section 3.9 contains controls for software support, which includes controls for periodic 
backups and regular application backups.  These items are reflected in the PACRM model as the 
Extent of Use of Preventative Software Measures and Extent of Use of a Backup Policy where 
Backups are Kept Offline factors.  Since 1996, the NIST 800-14 framework has directed U.S. 
federal government efforts in terms of information security. 
 Conversely, the ISO 27000 series of cybersecurity guidelines are directed towards 
improving cybersecurity in organizations all over the world.  The ISO 27000 framework is a 
series of related guidelines, which IT managers across a wide range of domains and 
organizations can use to strengthen and refine their cybersecurity strategies.  As such, it was not 
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written to be directly applicable to government settings.  It does, however, share many controls 
in common with frameworks that were.  For example, ISO 27002, which was originally 
published in October 2005, contains controls for human resources security as well as access 
control and operations security.  Both controls closely mirror the NIST 800-14 elements listed 
above. 
 Finally, the NIST 2014 framework represents the latest iteration in the evolution of 
information and cybersecurity best practices.  Each of the core categories in the framework are 
aligned with five high-level functions.  These functions are:  Identify, Protect, Detect, Respond 
and Recover (NIST, 2014).  Three of these five functions are represented as the response 
variables of choice in the PACRM model presented in Chapter 3 of this dissertation.  Table 2 
presents the brief descriptions of the high-level NIST functions, as articulated by the framework. 
Table 2: NIST 2014 Framework for Improving Critical Cybersecurity Infrastructure High‐Level Function Descriptions 
NIST 2014 High-Level Function  Description (NIST, 2014) 
Identify  Develop the organizational understanding to 
manage cybersecurity risk to systems, assets, 
data, and capabilities.  
Protect  Develop and implement the appropriate 
safeguards to ensure delivery of critical 
infrastructure services.  
Detect  Develop and implement the appropriate 
activities to identify the occurrence of a 
cybersecurity event.  
Respond  Develop and implement the appropriate 
activities to take action regarding a detected 
cybersecurity event.  
Recover  Develop and implement the appropriate 
activities to maintain plans for resilience and 
to restore any capabilities or services that were 
impaired due to a cybersecurity event.  
 
 These descriptions illustrate that, of the five functions enumerated, only four are directly 
applicable to the organizational-unit level.  The function that does not directly pertain to specific, 
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organizational-unit level activities is the Identify function.  The Identify function is primarily 
concerned with orienting the organization’s policy towards an awareness of information security 
issues.  As such, it is more suitable to levels of IT administration above that of the individual, 
organizational unit, which forms the unit of analysis for the present discussion.  The Response 
and Protect functions, meanwhile, are closely related. The primary difference between the two 
functions is that the Response function is concerned with communications, analysis, and 
response management after a cyberattack has occurred.  It is unlikely that individual workgroup 
IT managers, who work at the decentralized level of IT administration will have a codified 
response management plan, complete with mitigation strategies and communication protocols.  
This is deemed to be particularly true in institutions of higher learning where the IT personnel of 
any one school or department often labor under reduced staff and budgetary considerations.  It 
may be useful, however, to test this assumption in future iterations of the PACRM model in 
larger organizational units where the specific strategies of the response function are more likely 
to be utilized. 
2.11 Self-Efficacy 
Figure 3 is taken from Albert Bandura’s initial paper on self-efficacy.  In that paper, 
Bandura differentiates between outcome expectations and efficacy expectations in the following 
manner.  Outcome expectations are those expectations that cause an individual to estimate that a 
given set of behaviors will result in a certain outcome.  Efficacy expectations, on the other hand, 
are the individual’s belief that he or she can successfully execute the set of behaviors required to 
produce the desired outcome. 
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Figure 3: Diagrammatic representation of the difference between efficacy expectations and outcome expectations (Bandura, 
1977). 
For instance, an individual may reasonably expect that a certain behavior, or set of 
behaviors, will lead to a given outcome based on previous empirical or academic knowledge. At 
the same time, however, he or she may be reasonably uncertain as to whether they can enact such 
behavior(s).  Efficacy expectations affect both an individual’s initial coping behaviors and the 
persistence of those coping behaviors in the face of challenges.  Given that the appropriate skills 
and effective incentives are present, an individual’s efficacy expectations are a strong 
determinant of his or her choice of activities, how much effort he or she will expend in the 
pursuit of a goal, and how long he or she will sustain effort in the face of challenges towards that 
goal (Bandura, 1977). 
 We might reasonably substitute the components of information security discussed above 
into Bandura’s original model, as illustrated below in Figure 4.  By doing so, we see that a 
workgroup IT manager’s actual ability to detect, prevent, and recover from a cyberattack are 
outcome expectations, while his or her perceived readiness to perform those same actions are 
efficacy expectations.  That is, in Bandura’s original conceptualization, by increasing his or her 
abilities with respect to detection, prevention, and recovery of cyberattacks, an IT manager may 
reasonably expect to suffer fewer and/or less severe cyberattacks, relative to the ultimate 
outcome of such attacks.  However, his or her perceived readiness to detect, prevent, and, if 
necessary, recover from a cyberattack translates into a belief as to whether he or she can perform 
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those behaviors.  Since the IT manager at this level of administration is integral to determining 
the cybersecurity readiness of the organizational unit, it stands to reason that the organizational 
unit likewise benefits from an increase in either the manager’s outcome expectations or in his or 
her efficacy expectations. 
 
Figure 4: Self‐efficacy theory (SET) model with information security components 
While it is instructive to situate elements of information security within Bandura’s 
original framework to show that self-efficacy is germane to the present discussion, this 
dissertation is not concerned with merely validating Bandura’s original SET model in a new 
context, any more than has already been done.  SET has already been applied to the information 
and computer domain through previous research, most notably in the form of Computer Self-
Efficacy (CSE) (Compeau & Higgins, 1995).   
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3 THEORETICAL CONTRIBUTIONS 
3.1 Research Questions 
The present dissertation is concerned with answering the following questions. 
RQ1: What factors are associated with the perceived readiness of workgroup IT 
managers to detect, prevent, and if necessary, recover from a cyberattack? 
 
RQ2: Does attitude towards risk affect the relationship between an IT manager’s 
previous level of experience and the extent of his or her use of cybersecurity best 
practices. 
 
 
To attempt to answer these questions, we start by revisiting Bandura’s original definition 
of efficacy expectations.  Recall that efficacy expectations are an individual’s belief in his or her 
ability to produce a given set of behaviors.  In terms of information security management, 
efficacy expectations represent the IT manager’s perceived readiness to detect, prevent, and 
recover from a cyberattack.  These perceptions, in turn, affect his or her actual cybersecurity 
readiness.   
As per Bandura’s original (1977) model, efficacy expectations are informed by four 
major sources of information.  Among these are performance accomplishments, vicarious 
experiences, verbal persuasion, and emotional arousal.  Each of these four sources of information 
provide feedback to the participant, which helps to strengthen his or her efficacy expectations.  
Each of the four sources, in turn, can be supplied through different modes of induction.  Figure 5 
is from Bandura’s article and helps to illustrate the portion of his model pertaining to efficacy 
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expectations.  Figure 6 is a repeat of Figure 1 from this dissertation.  It illustrates the 
PACRM model in its entirety.  It has been placed below for the convenience of the reader. 
 
Figure 5:  Efficacy Expectations (Bandura, 1977) 
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Figure 6:  PACRM Conceptual Model Diagram (Repeat of Figure 1) 
 The PACRM model, shown in Figure 6 above, incorporates several of Bandura’s original 
sources that are believed to affect an IT manager’s perceived readiness to detect, prevent, and 
recover from a cyberattack.  Recall that the four primary factors of the PACRM model are the IT 
manager’s previous level of cybersecurity experience, the extent of his or her use of 
cybersecurity best practices, his or her awareness of the computer and network environment in 
and around the organizational unit, and the degree to which the user community that he or she 
supports is educated about issues related to information security.  Recall, also, that the secondary 
research questions that are pertinent to this research are: 
RQ1a: How is an IT manager’s previous level of cybersecurity experience related to his 
or her perceived readiness to detect, prevent, and recover from a cyberattack.  
 
RQ1b: How is the extent of an IT manager’s use of cybersecurity best practices related to 
his or her perceived readiness to detect, prevent, and recover from a cyberattack. 
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RQ1c: How is an IT manager’s awareness of the computer and network environment in 
and around the organizational unit related to his or her perceived readiness to 
detect and prevent a cyberattack.  
 
RQ1d: How is the degree to which the user community is educated about issues 
pertaining to information security related to the IT manager’s perceived readiness 
to detect and prevent a cyberattack. 
 
It can be surmised that the factors related to research question 1c use the modes of 
induction related to the emotional arousal source from Figure 5 above.  In other words, an IT 
manager’s level of awareness of his or her environment entails, by its nature, a level of comfort 
(or discomfort) with various aspects of that environment.  Similarly, since previous training and 
experience with cybersecurity-related activities entails a degree of real-world and simulated 
events, it stands to reason that the factor of the PACRM model that is related to a manager’s 
previous level of cybersecurity experience necessarily incorporates aspects of both the 
performance accomplishments and vicarious experience sources, together with their concomitant 
modes of induction. 
In Bandura’s original research, he surmises that the performance accomplishment and 
vicarious experience sources are both thought to exert a stronger influence over an individual’s 
efficacy expectations than does the emotional arousal source.  For that reason, we might expect 
to see a relatively strong correlation between an IT manager’s previous level of experience with 
cybersecurity and his or her perceived readiness to detect, prevent, and recover from a 
cyberattack.  However, that relationship will be somewhat mediated by the extent to which he or 
she uses known cybersecurity best practices. 
3.2 Conceptual Model Description 
 The argument that theory is an important component in confirmatory research is well 
established in the psychometric literature (Blalock, 1969; Bagozzi, 1980).  The use of theories to 
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drive confirmatory research works because they help to pre-specify the nature of constructs, 
which in turn informs the measurement of those constructs.  In addition, the use of well-
grounded and clearly articulated theories propels research within a given domain by providing a 
firm foundation upon which to build future research.  Theory also aids in the clear specification 
of measurements, thereby strengthening the conclusions garnered by those measurments 
(Churchill, 1979).   
Figure 6 shows that the factors for the model are organized into four main groups.  The 
first group is the IT manager’s level of previous experience with cybersecurity.  It attempts to 
answer RQ1a from above.  The second group of factors attempts to capture the extent to which 
the manager uses cybersecurity best practices.  In doing so, it seeks to answer RQ1b.  The third 
group is a set of awareness-based factors that are related to RQ1c.  The factors that comprise this 
group attempt to capture the manager’s level of knowledge and awareness with various aspects 
of his or her computer and network environment.  The fourth group, relevant to RQ1d, is made 
up of a single factor that looks at the degree to which the user community that the IT manager 
supports is educated about issues related to information and computer security.  Lastly, the IT 
manager’s risk avoidance score on a group of variables serves as a moderator of the relationships 
between the IT manager’s Level of Previous Experience with Cybersecurity and the Extent of 
Use of Cybersecurity Best Practices factors.  
 Together, these factors are thought to inform the IT manager’s perceived readiness to 
detect, prevent, and, if necessary, recover from a cyberattack.  Table 3 lists the factors shown in 
Figure 6, along with a short description of each. 
Table 3: PACRM Factors and Descriptions of Their Associated Survey Elements 
PACRM Model Factor  Factor Description 
Hours of Cyber Threat Detection and 
Prevention Training 
 The total amount of time that the IT manager 
has spent engaged in cyber threat detection 
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and prevention training.  This variable may 
include the time spent in formalized training 
programs and/or spent preparing to obtain 
cybersecurity related certifications. 
Part of the summative factor, Level of 
Previous Experience with Cybersecurity. 
Level of Experience Stopping Cyberattacks  The level of self-reported experience with 
stopping cyberattacks.  The IT manager may 
have obtained such experience through 
training programs or through on-the-job 
cybersecurity tasks, such as working as an 
independent Certified Ethical Hacker© or as 
a security specialist. 
Part of the summative factor, Level of 
Previous Experience with Cybersecurity. 
Level of Experience Initiating Cyberattacks  The level of self-reported experience with 
initiating cyberattacks.  As with Level of 
Experience Stopping Cyberattacks, the IT 
manager may have gathered such experience 
through formalized training sessions, 
certification programs, or actual hacking 
experience. 
Part of the summative factor, Level of 
Previous Experience with Cybersecurity. 
Personal Risk Avoidance Score  Attempts to capture the IT Manager’s 
attitudes toward risk avoidance in both 
general terms and in terms of workplace 
information security. 
Extent of Use of Network Activity 
Monitoring Mechanisms 
 The extent of the IT manager’s use of 
network activity logging mechanisms such 
as IDS/IPS and sensor deployments and/or 
traffic analyzers to capture actual network 
events. 
Utilization of network activity monitoring 
measures also implies the periodic and 
systematic review of activity logs to look for 
signs of suspicious activity or adverse 
events.   
Extent of Control Over Physical Access to 
Network Resources 
 The extent of the IT manager’s level of 
control over physical access to computer and 
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network resources within his or her school or 
department. 
Restricting physical access can be achieved 
through a combination of physical deterrents 
(such as locked rooms and/or server 
cabinets) or electronic means (such as by 
locking the BIOS or using encryption). 
Extent of Use of Preventative Software 
Measures  
 The extent of the IT manager’s use of 
preventative measures as part of his or her 
computer security strategy.   
Extent of Use of a Backup Policy Where 
Backups are Kept Offline 
 The extent to the which the IT manager uses 
regular backup processes as part of a 
working backup policy of business-critical 
computer resources. 
Perceived Awareness of the Immediate 
Threat Environment 
 The IT manager’s level of knowledge about 
the volume, type, and integrity of network 
traffic, which exists on the computer 
network that he or she supports. 
This measure also attempts to capture the IT 
manager’s level of awareness that the 
computers he or she supports are free from 
viruses or malware and are not being used in 
the support of illicit activities, such as in 
support of a Distributed Denial of Service 
(DDoS) attack. 
Perceived Awareness of Vulnerabilities in 
the Physical Infrastructure 
 The IT manager’s level of knowledge about 
the physical infrastructure of his or her 
computer network as well as any potential 
vulnerabilities that may exist. 
The IT manager’s level of awareness of the 
number of potential vulnerabilities in his or 
her computer network as well as the physical 
infrastructure of his or her computer 
network. 
Perceived Awareness of Defensive 
Measures in Place 
 The IT manager’s level of knowledge about 
the type of defensive measures currently in 
place to protect his or her computer network 
from unauthorized access. 
The IT manager’s level of awareness of the 
type of defensive measures that are in place 
to secure his or her computer network. 
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Degree of User Community Awareness of 
Security Issues 
 The degree to which the end user community 
that the IT manager supports is educated on, 
and aware of, several issues related to 
computer and information security. 
 
3.3 Research Propositions 
The four groups of factors, as mentioned above, are the IT manager’s previous level of 
experience with cybersecurity, the extent of his or her use of cybersecurity best practices, his or 
her awareness of various aspects of the computer and information environment in and around the 
organizational unit, and the degree to which the user community that he or she supports is 
educated and aware of issues pertaining to security. 
The first factor is a simple composite measure, comprised of the amount of time that the 
IT manager has spent engaged in cyberattack detection and prevention training, either as a part of 
a certification program or otherwise.  Also included in this factor is the manager’s self-reported 
level of previous experience with stopping cyberattacks and his or her self-reported level of 
previous experience with initiating cyberattacks.  Each of these activities may legitimately be 
performed as one aspect of a training program or during work which is lawfully performed as a 
security analyst. The IT manager’s overall level of previous cybersecurity experience is proposed 
to have a positive relationship with each of the four factors associated with the Extent of Use of 
Cybersecurity Best Practices factors.  These relationships can be seen in Figure 6 above.  As a 
manager’s overall level of previous experience in cybersecurity increases, the extent of his or her 
use of best practices should likewise increase.  The decision to make the IT manager’s Level of 
Previous Experience with Cybersecurity a summative measure was made early in the conceptual 
design process.  It was thought that, due to the sensitive nature of asking professionals to 
voluntarily divulge the relative frequency that they have spent initiating cyberattacks, that a 
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probable floor effect would be seen in that variable.  Therefore, the decision was made to make it 
part of a summative construct to help mitigate that possible effect. 
The proposed relationships between the IT manager’s Level of Previous Cybersecurity 
Experience and his or her Extent of Use of Cybersecurity Best Practices are moderated by his or 
her level of Personal Risk Avoidance.  Therefore, the relationship between an individual’s 
previous experience with cybersecurity and the extent of that individual’s use of cybersecurity 
best practices should be more pronounced for those individuals with a higher level of risk 
avoidance. 
The extent of an IT manager’s use of best practices contains four factors.  These factors 
attempt to capture information about the extent of the IT manager’s use of network activity 
monitoring mechanisms, the extent to which the IT manager exercises physical control to 
computer and network resources, the extent of the IT manager’s use of preventative measures 
such as firewalls and strong passwords, and the extent of the IT manager’s use of a backup 
policy with backups that are kept offline.  Each of these factors are proposed to be related to the 
perceived readiness factors in the following ways. 
First, the Extent of the Use of Network Activity Monitoring Mechanisms factor examines 
the degree to which the IT manager uses activity logging mechanisms such as IDS/IPS 
deployments and/or sensor deployments to capture and log real-time network events.  This factor 
also measures whether log data, if it is captured, undergoes a systematic review to search for 
signs of adverse events or suspicious activity.   This factor is therefore proposed to have a 
positive relationship with the manager’s Perceived Readiness to Detect Attacks.  The reasoning 
behind this proposed relationship is that an IT manager should find him or herself in a more 
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advantageous position to detect a cyberattack if he or she is periodically willing and able to 
capture and review network activity log data. 
The second factor in this group is the Extent of Control Over Physical Access to Network 
Resources factor.  Restricting physical access to sensitive computer and network resources has 
been shown to be effective in reducing incidents of computer abuse.  The relationship between 
this factor and the manager’s Perceived Readiness to Prevent Attacks is therefore proposed to be 
a positive one. 
Third, the Extent of Use of Preventative Software Measures factor is likewise thought be 
positively related to the Perceived Readiness to Prevent Attacks factor.  Preventative software 
measures include the use of strong passwords to authenticate users as well as the use of antivirus 
and anti-malware software to check for malicious software on the computer.  In addition, 
software-defined firewalls prevent unauthorized intrusions that originate from outside the 
computer.  Regular critical software and operating system updates are also thought to contribute 
to this factor. 
Finally, the Extent of Use of a Backup Policy Where Backups are Kept Offline factor is 
thought to have a positive relationship to Perceived Readiness to Recover from an Attack.  This 
proposed relationship is based on the reasoning that offline backups can be used to preserve 
clean copies of the organizational unit’s data, which can then be used to recover services in the 
event of a malicious attack.  Since hackers often target online backups to manipulate them in the 
same manner as they have done with the primary system, the offline component of this factor is 
deemed to be especially important component of this factor. 
The perceived awareness factors consist of three general elements.  First, Perceived 
Awareness of the Immediate Threat Environment attempts to capture the level of knowledge and 
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awareness that the IT manager has about the volume, type, and integrity of network traffic on 
both the network that he or she supports and any intersecting networks.  This factor is proposed 
to have direct, positive relationships with both Perceived Readiness to Detect Attacks, and 
Perceived Readiness to Prevent Attacks.  Therefore, the greater the manager’s awareness of the 
threat environment, i.e. the more comfortable he or she feels about the state of knowledge about 
the status of the computer network, then the greater the readiness he or she should feel to detect 
and prevent any potential cyberattacks against that network.  
The second factor in the awareness-based group is the Perceived Awareness of 
Vulnerabilities in the Physical Infrastructure factor.  This factor attempts to capture whether the 
IT manager is knowledgeable about both the physical infrastructure of the organizational unit’s 
computer network and any potential vulnerabilities within that infrastructure.  This factor is 
thought to have a positive relationship with Perceived Readiness to Prevent Attacks.  As a 
manager’s level of knowledge and awareness about the physical infrastructure of the computer 
network increases, so too will his or her perceived readiness to prevent a potential cyberattack. 
The final factor in the awareness-based group is Perceived Awareness of Defensive 
Measures in Place.  The term “defensive measures” is left vague by design. Such measures may 
be procedural (sign-in sheets to access sensitive computer or data resources, etc.), physical 
(restricted physical access, separate subnets and physical connections for sensitive resources, 
etc.), or electronic (firewalls, IPSs, etc.).  Rather than list all, or even a subset, of the possible 
defensive measures, it was instead determined that the purpose of this factor is to capture the IT 
manager’s level of knowledge and awareness of whatever defensive measures he or she has in 
place.  This factor is proposed to positively affect Perceived Readiness to Prevent Attacks.  As 
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the manager’s level of knowledge and awareness of his or her defenses increases, so too should 
his or her perceived readiness to prevent cyberattacks. 
Finally, the Degree of User Community Awareness About Issues Pertaining to Security 
factor is thought to be positively related to both Perceived Readiness to Detect Attacks and 
Perceived Readiness to Prevent Attacks.  Several of the IT managers who were interviewed 
during the initial pilot testing phase of the project remarked that their readiness to detect and 
prevent cyberattacks is largely dependent on their users.  It was therefore determined that the 
awareness of an organizational unit’s user community on various issues related to computer and 
information security could be a vital component in determining the IT manager’s perceived 
readiness to detect and prevent cyberattacks.  Aspects of user community awareness may include 
the need to keep computer operating systems and applications consistently updated, the need to 
exercise caution when bringing external USB drives and storage devices into the workplace, the 
need to exercise caution when downloading and installing software from the Internet, the need to 
exercise caution when confronting communication situations that could potentially divulge 
sensitive information to unauthorized personnel, and the need to exercise caution when opening 
email attachments or clickable links.  Table 4 lists the proposition number, as illustrated in 
Figure 6 presented above, along with a short description of each. 
Table 4: PACRM Propositions and Their Associated Descriptions 
PACRM 
Proposition 
Number 
 Proposition Description 
1  The IT manager’s level of previous experience with cybersecurity is 
positively related to the extent of his or her use of network activity 
monitoring mechanisms. 
2  The IT manager’s level of previous experience with cybersecurity is 
positively related to the extent of his or her control over unauthorized 
physical access to computer or network resources within the school or 
department.  
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3  The IT manager’s level of previous experience with cybersecurity is 
positively related to the extent of his or her use of preventative software 
measures. 
4  The IT manager’s level of previous experience with cybersecurity is 
positively related to the extent of his or her use of a backup policy where 
the backups are kept offline. 
5  The extent of the IT manager’s use of network activity monitoring 
mechanisms will be greater for those managers who show a greater level of 
risk avoidance then it will be for managers who are less risk avoidant, 
holding previous level of cybersecurity experience constant. 
6  The extent of the IT manager’s control over physical access to the 
computer network will be greater for those managers who show a greater 
level of risk avoidance, then it will be for managers who are less risk 
avoidant, holding previous level of cybersecurity experience constant. 
7  The extent of the IT manager’s use of software preventative measures will 
be greater for those managers who show a greater level of risk avoidance, 
then it will be for managers who are less risk avoidant, holding previous 
level of cybersecurity experience constant. 
8  The extent of the IT manager’s use of a backup policy where backups are 
kept offline will be greater for those managers who show a greater level of 
risk avoidance, then it will be for managers who are less risk avoidant, 
holding previous level of cybersecurity experience constant. 
9  The extent to which the IT manager uses network activity monitoring 
mechanisms is positively related to his or her perceived readiness to detect 
cyberattacks. 
10  The extent to which the IT manager controls physical access to network 
resources is positively related to his or her perceived readiness to prevent 
cyberattacks. 
11  The extent to which the IT manager uses preventative software measures is 
positively related to his or her perceived readiness to prevent cyberattacks. 
12  The extent to which the IT manager uses a backup policy where the 
backups are kept offline is positively related to his or her perceived 
readiness to recover from a cyberattack. 
13  The IT manger’s perceived awareness of the immediate threat environment 
in and around his or her organizational unit is positively related to his or 
her perceived readiness to detect a cyberattack. 
14  The IT manager’s perceived awareness of the immediate threat 
environment in and around his or her organizational unit is positively 
related to his or her perceived readiness to prevent a cyberattack. 
15  The IT manager’s perceived awareness of vulnerabilities in the physical 
infrastructure he or she supports is positively related to his or her perceived 
readiness to prevent a cyberattack. 
16  The IT manager’s perceived awareness of defensive measures in place is 
positively related with his or her perceived readiness to prevent a 
cyberattack. 
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17  The degree of user community awareness of security issues is positively 
related with the IT manager’s perceived readiness to detect a cyberattack. 
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4 METHODOLOGY 
 
4.1 PACRM Measurement Model 
Each of the conceptual factors listed above have their associated elements in the PACRM 
survey, which is presented in its initial iteration in Appendix B and in its final version as 
Appendix C.  For the convenience of the reader, Table 5 presents the full measurment model 
detailing how each factor is to be measured. 
Table 5:  PACRM Measurement Model 
Concept Construct Survey Items Description 
Previous 
Experience 
Level of Previous 
Experience with 
Cybersecurity 
PE.3 
PE.4.1 
PE.4.2 
 Number of hours spent taking 
part in cybersecurity training. 
 Previous level of experience 
with preventing or stopping 
cyberattacks. 
 Previous level of experience 
initiating cyberattacks. 
Risk Avoidance Personal Risk 
Avoidance Score 
D.8.1 
D.8.2 
D.8.3 
 General risk avoidance 
 Risk avoidance in work 
settings. 
 Risk avoidance in terms of 
information security at work.  
Network Activity 
Monitoring 
Extent of Use of 
Network Activity 
Monitoring 
Mechanisms 
EU.1.1 
EU.1.2 
EU.1.3 
EU.2.1 
EU2.2 
EU2.3 
 Extent of Use of and frequency 
checking network activity logs 
to monitor network activity. 
 Extent of Use of and frequency 
monitoring IDS and /or IPS 
reports on the network. 
 Extent of Use of and frequency 
analyzing sensor deployment 
and/or traffic analyzer reports 
for the network.  
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Physical Access 
Control 
Extent of Control 
over Physical 
Access to 
Network 
Resources 
EU.1.4 
EU.1.5 
EU.1.6 
EU.2.4 
 Extent of use of controlling 
physical access to network and 
server resources. 
 Servers or other vital computer 
resources are secured in a 
locked room or server cabinet. 
 Extent of use of computers 
with a locked BIOS where it is 
impossible to boot from an 
external device. 
Preventative 
Measures 
Extent of Use of 
Preventative 
Software 
Measures 
EU.1.7 
EU.1.8 
EU.1.9 
EU1.10 
EU1.11 
EU1.12 
EU.2.5 
EU.2.6 
EU.2.7 
EU.2.8 
EU.2.9 
EU.2.10 
 Computers with encrypted 
hard drives. 
 Servers or other vital computer 
resources with encrypted hard 
drives. 
 Strong  passwords updated 
regularly to prevent 
unauthorized use. 
 Computers protected with 
antivirus software that is 
updated regularly. 
 Computers protected with anti-
malware software that is 
updated regularly. 
 Computers protected by one or 
more firewalls with settings 
updated to reflect current and 
emerging threats and to allow 
for approved applications. 
 Critical software and operating 
system updates. 
Regular Offline 
Backups 
Extent of Use of a 
Backup Policy 
Where Backups 
are Kept Offline 
EU.1.13 
EU.2.11 
 Regular backups of servers or 
other vital computer resources 
that are then kept offline. 
User Community 
Awareness 
Degree of User 
Community 
Awareness of 
Security Issues 
ED.1.1 
ED.1.2 
ED.1.3 
ED.1.4 
ED.1.5 
ED.1.6 
 Users are educated about the 
need to update work computer 
operating system and/or 
applications regularly. 
 Users are educated about the 
need to update work computer 
antivirus definitions regularly. 
 Users are educated about the 
need to exercise caution when 
using an external USB drive. 
 52 
 Users are educated about the 
need to exercise caution when 
downloading and installing 
software or apps from 
untrusted sources. 
 Users are educated about the 
need to exercise caution when 
engaging in conversations 
about sensitive information. 
 Users are educated about the 
need to exercise caution when 
opening email attachments and 
clickable links in email. 
IT Manager 
Awareness of 
Threat 
Environment 
Perceived 
Awareness of 
Immediate 
Threat 
Environment 
PA.1.1 
PA.1.2 
PA.2.1 
PA.2.2 
 
 Level of knowledge and 
awareness about the volume 
and type of network traffic 
flowing through the network. 
 Level of knowledge and 
awareness about the integrity 
of network traffic on 
intersecting networks. 
IT Manager 
Awareness of 
Physical 
Infrastructure 
Perceived 
Awareness of 
Vulnerabilities in 
Physical 
Infrastructure 
PA.1.3 
PA.1.4 
PA.2.3 
PA.2.4 
 
 Level of knowledge and 
awareness about the physical 
infrastructure of the network. 
 Level of knowledge and 
awareness about potential 
vulnerabilities within the 
network. 
IT Manager 
Awareness of 
Defensive 
Measures in 
Place 
Perceived 
Awareness of 
Defensive 
Measures in 
Place 
PA.1.5 
PA.2.5 
 Level of knowledge and 
awareness about type of 
defensive measures in place. 
Readiness to 
Detect Attacks 
Perceived 
Readiness to 
Detect Attacks 
PR.1.1 
PR.1.2 
PR.2.1 
 Perceived ability and readiness 
to detect whether computer or 
network resources have been 
compromised. 
 Perceived ability and readiness 
to detect whether computer or 
network resources are being 
used in support of illegal 
activities. 
Readiness to 
Prevent Attacks 
Perceived 
Readiness to 
Prevent Attacks 
PR.1.3 
PR.1.4 
PR.2.2 
PR.2.3 
 Perceived ability and readiness 
to prevent a cyberattack from 
stealing sensitive information. 
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 Perceived ability and readiness 
to prevent a ransom ware 
attack. 
 Perceived ability and readiness 
to prevent a ransom ware from 
encrypting sensitive data 
resources. 
Readiness to 
Recover from 
Attacks 
Perceived 
Readiness to 
Recover from 
Attacks 
PR.1.5 
PR.2.4 
PR.2.5 
 Perceived ability and readiness 
to recover users’ access to 
computer resources in the 
event of a ransom ware attack 
without paying the ransom. 
 Perceived readiness to recover 
data resources after they have 
been deleted or encrypted as 
the result of a cyber or ransom 
ware attack. 
 
4.2 Instrument Validity 
 Knowledge about a given phenomenon can only be clearly established when it can be 
successfully demonstrated that the means of measurement accurately represent the theoretical 
constructs that they are intended to measure.  The question then becomes, how can researchers 
ensure “goodness of fit” between measurement instruments and the theoretical constructs they 
are intended to measure?  The process by which this occurs is known as instrument validation, 
which has been well articulated in previous research (Cook & Campbell, 1979).  Instrument 
validation seeks to establish several different types of validities.  Those validities, along with the 
questions they seek to answer, are presented in Figure 7.  The figure is adopted from Detmar 
Straub’s (1989) article entitled, “Validating Research Instruments”.   
As Cook and Campbell note, and as Straub’s figure indicates, the process of instrument 
validation should precede other core statistical and empirical validities such as statistical 
conclusion validity.  This is because most statistical tests to establish internal validity and 
statistical conclusion validity are based on the assumption that the error terms between the 
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observations are uncorrelated (Hair, et al., 1979; Lindman, 1974).  As Straub (1989) notes, if 
participants in a research study answer in some way that is a function of the instrument instead of 
the underlying constructs, this assumption will be violated.  For statistical tests that are not 
robust in this regard, a violation of this assumption will present itself in the form of unstable 
parameter estimates and unusually large standard errors (Lindman, 1974). 
 
Figure 7: Step by Step Process of Instrument Validity (Straub, 1989) 
 Construct validity seeks to answer the question of whether the data is measuring a true 
phenomenon, or is merely an artifact of the measurment instrument itself (Cronbach, 1971; 
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Campbell & Fiske, 1959).  In order to answer this question, correlations between observations 
are studied.  If the observations reflect valid constructs in this sense, then one should expect to 
see high correlations among measurements that are intended to measure the same construct, even 
when using different methods, and low correlations between measures that are intended to 
measure different constructs (Campbell & Fiske, 1959). Campbell and Fiske argue that the 
multitrait-multimethod (MTMM) approach works well as a means of establishing construct 
validity.  Other methods that have been shown to establish construct validity are confirmatory 
factor analysis (CFA) and principal components analysis (PCA) (Long, 1983; Nunnally, 1967).  
Construct validity is established when correlations among similar items, or “traits”, are 
sufficiently associated with one another, but significantly different than zero.  This is the case 
when demonstrating convergent validity.  Disimilar items that are sufficiently different from one 
another demonstrate discriminant validity. 
 In addition to construct validity, instrument validation is concerned with a measurement 
instrument’s reliability.  It is possible that participants’ answers on any particular survey item are 
a function of their understanding of the item instead of the underlying construct it is meant to 
represent.  This can be due either to the way in which the survey was administered, or because 
the item itself is ambiguous or otherwise misleading.  When the responses on one or more survey 
items differ from alternative measures of those same items, that measurement instrument is said 
to have poor reliability.  Reliability, therefore, is an evaluation of measurement accuracy 
(Cronbach, 1951).  Large Cronbach’s alphas indicate high correlations among similar or same 
items, which is a good indication that the measures are reliable. 
 Moving beyond instrument validation, internal validity is concerned with whether or not 
observed effects could be the result of unmeasured variables.  In essence, measures of internal 
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validity seek to determine whether rival explanations, other than the researcher’s hypotheses, 
could be responsible for an instrument’s findings.  Within the MIS discipline, the importance of 
establishing internal validity has been previously argued by Jarvenpaa, Dickson, & DeSanctis 
(1984). 
 Lastly, statistical conclusion validity is an assessment of whether the mathematical 
correlations between variables are likely due to chance, or to some true underlying covariation, 
which is presumed to be the result of the researcher’s theoretical assumptions (Cook & 
Campbell, 1979).  Errors in the conclusions regarding true covariation between variables 
represent violations of statistical conclusion validity, and can be affected by both sample size and 
the reliability of the measurment instrument.  Statistical conclusion validity can also be 
determined by the power of a statistical test.  The statistical power of a test is closely associated 
with sample size, so that tests which employ larger sample sizes inherently have more power, 
and are therefore less likely to improperly reject the null hypothesis (Baroudi & Orlikowski, 
1989; Cohen, 1969; Kraemer & Thiemann, 1987). 
 Straub (1989) makes the point that many common statistical techniques, such as 
regression, MANCOVA, factor analysis, and LISREL, make no conclusions regarding the 
viability of rival assumptions or the meaningfulness of the underlying theoretical constructs.  
Statistical conclusions of validity simply evaluate measurement results based on their 
mathematical correlations.  Without prior instrument validation, the possibility remains that 
those correlations are due to some spurious explanation, such as unaccounted-for moderator 
variables (Sharma, Durand, & Gur-Arie, 1981), or misspecification of the underlying theoretical 
model (Blalock, 1969).  As Straub notes, conducting instrument validation prior to tests of 
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statistical conclusion validity strengthens the research study’s findings because the effects of 
extraneous moderator variables and rival hypotheses have been previously controlled for. 
 Instrument validation will occur on the PACRM measurement instrument in the 
following manner.  Building on Straub’s (1989) example for instrument validation, the validation 
of the PACRM survey will be conducted in three stages.  Stages one and two comprise the pilot 
test phase while stage 3 comprises the roll-out phase.  The pilot test phase will test the content 
validity of the proposed survey while the roll-out phase will test its construct validity and 
reliability.  Lastly, the model will be tested in a structural analysis framework using averaged 
scores on the measurement variables to represent the constructs.  
The instrument is designed to elicit responses from IT managers who are employed at the 
organizational-unit level at complex, multi-tiered organizations.  For the initial study, the 
organizations targeted will be colleges and universities in the United States.  The four groups of 
factors discussed in Chapter 3 above have been organized into respective blocks of questions on 
the survey.  Each block contains survey questions that correspond to the measurement model 
elements listed in Table 5. 
4.3 Pilot Test Phase Overview 
 During this phase, the draft survey was presented to IT managers who matched the 
participant specifications for the project.  First, in-depth interviews were conducted with a 
number of workgroup IT managers working at a large public university in the southeastern 
United States.  Interviewees were prompted to answer open-ended, qualitative questions 
regarding their cybersecurity practices, their perceptions of the need for awareness to several 
factors related to computer and network security, and the roles that previous experience in 
cybersecurity and attitudes towards risk have in shaping their perceptions of their cybersecurity 
 58 
readiness.  The interview questions that were used appear as Appendix A in this document.  
Concepts that were independently raised by multiple participants were noted and the precise 
language was recorded in order to capture any perceptual communalities in mental constructs 
between the participants.  This helped to establish the content validity of the instrument. 
The second part of stage 1 involved the participants taking an initial draft of the survey, 
during which they were encouraged to “think aloud.”  The think-aloud protocol has been 
previously used in Management Information Systems (MIS) studies where new survey 
instruments were proposed (Hilkert, et al., 2011), as well as in many psychology studies.  Notes 
were recorded by the primary researcher and any commonalities between respondants were 
incorporated into subsequent drafts of the survey.   
 In stage two of the pilot test phase, the survey was administered as a web-based, 
Qualtrics survey to a number of IT managers working at the school or department level at several 
colleges and universities throughout the southeastern United States.  The survey responses 
generated during this stage of testing were subjected to tests of reliability using the Cronbach’s 
alpha technique.  It has been shown that the reliability and overall construct validity of a 
proposed instrument can be further established through factorial methods such as Principal 
Components Analysis (PCA) (Long, 1983; Nunnally, 1967).  However, the number of responses 
were not of a sufficient quantity during stage 2 to conduct a valid PCA analysis.  The results of 
the Cronbach’s alpha test, therefore, are shown in Table 12 below. 
4.4 Stage 1 Results 
Stage 1 consisted of qualitative interviews with a number of IT managers who all work at 
the decentralized school or department level of a large, public university located in the 
southeastern United States.  During this stage, each manager provided answers to all of the 
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interview questions and participated in an initial draft of the PACRM survey.  Table 6 provides 
some basic demographic information for this initial test group. 
Table 6: Basic Demographic Data for Stage 1 Test Group 
Gender Number of 
Participants 
Approximate 
Mean Age 
Approximate 
Mean Years 
of 
Experience 
in the IT 
Field 
Approximate 
Mean Years 
of 
Experience 
in IT 
Positions in 
Higher 
Education 
Academic 
Departments 
Supported 
Male 3 54.17 22.5 17.5 3 
Female 1 --- 7.5 7.5 1 
 
 As can be seen in Appendix A of this document, the interview questions were designed to 
elicit responses to the factors that were thought to be relevant to increasing an IT manager’s level 
of cybersecurity readiness.  Respondents were asked to assess the roles that best practices, 
awareness of computer and network security, previous level of experience in cybersecurity, the 
number and type of cybersecurity-related certifications, and the importance of attitudes towards 
risk had in shaping their perceptions of their cybersecurity readiness.  The frequency of common 
responses, which reflect the managers’ answers for each survey question are listed below in 
Tables 7-11. 
Table 7: Stage 1 Frequency of Answers Related to Specific Elements for Question 1 ‐ Best Practices 
Educate 
User 
Community 
Operating 
System and 
Application 
Management 
Use of 
Preventative 
Software 
Measures 
Control 
Physical 
Access  
Use of 
Backup 
Procedures 
Use of 
Encryption 
3 2 2 2 1 1 
 
Table 8: Stage 1 Frequency of Answers Related to Specific Elements for Question 2 ‐ Awareness of Network Security 
Know Your 
Contacts in 
Keep up 
to Date 
on 
Understand It 
to the Level 
Be a 
Good 
Educator  
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the 
Organization 
Current 
Threats 
of Your 
Responsibility 
2 1 1 1 
 
 
Table 9: Stage 1 Frequency of Answers Related to Specific Elements for Question 3 ‐ Importance of Previous Experience with 
Cybersecurity 
Training is 
an 
Important 
but not Key 
Factor 
Previous 
Experience 
with Being 
Hacked is 
Vital 
Self-
Education / 
Continuing 
Education is 
the Key 
1 1 3 
 
 
Table 10: Stage 1 Frequency of Answers Related to Specific Elements for Question 4 ‐ Importance of the Number and Type of 
Certifications 
Certifications 
Are an 
Important 
Factor 
Certifications 
Are Not 
Important 
Depends on 
the Type of 
Certification 
1 2 1 
 
 
Table 11: Stage 1 Frequency of Answers Related to Specific Elements for Question 5 ‐ Importance of Attitudes Towards Risk 
Important to 
be Risk 
Avoidant 
Awareness of 
Risk is 
Important 
3 1 
 
 The relatively high frequency of responses that were generated in the pre and post-survey 
interview questions that stressed the importance of educating the user community on issues 
related to information security led to the inclusion of the Degree of User Community Awareness 
of Security Issues factor in the PACRM model and an additional block of survey questions on the 
instrument.  These changes are reflected in Appendix A as well as in the PACRM model, 
illustrated in Figures 1 and 6 of this dissertation.  Overall, the pre-test stage 1 qualitative 
interview questions were helpful in refining the content validity of the survey questions.  For 
example, in addition to the inclusion of the additional factor, the negative reaction that was 
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evident in the responses, with regard to the number and type of cybersecurity-related 
certifications, combined with the ubiquity with which the managers indicated that they had zero 
cybersecurity-related certifications, led to the thinking that this factor should be removed from 
the model.  Although it was evident that it should not be part of the present analysis, the question 
was left in the survey to gather data for future research.  Therefore, the survey was modified to 
combine multiple questions related to that subject into a single, optional question that asks 
respondants to list any cybersecurity-related certifications that they currently hold.   
 Likewise, the “think aloud” protocol that the managers engaged in while taking the initial 
draft of the survey instrument highlighted many potential areas for improvement.  Primarily, 
each of the managers surveyed found the survey length to be “reasonable,” “okay,” and “about 
right.”  One of the respondants remarked that age should be the first question in the survey, and 
this was deemed a reasonable suggestion.  As such, that change was made in subsequent drafts of 
instrument.  In addition, two areas of concern with the survey became evident through this 
exercise.  First, several of the managers visibly reacted to the question about their level of 
experience with initiating cyberattacks.  Recall that this reaction was anticipated during the 
conceptual development phase of the project, which is why the item was designed as one 
component of a summative measure.  Furthermore, the data shows a tendency towards a possible 
floor effect on this item with the majority of managers (n=3) indicating “No Experience at All” 
and the last manager (n=1) indicating “a Little Experience.”  While no conclusions can be made 
from such a small sample size, the visceral reaction that the majority of managers displayed 
indicates that the researchers were correct in anticipating a floor effect for this measure.   
Second, the think aloud exercise also demonstrated a degree of confusion among the 
managers with respect to the perceived awareness questions.  These questions are included as 
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PA.2 in Appendix B.  All four managers expressed audible consternation at the wording in that 
particular grouping.  In post-survey followup questions, it was determined that every manager 
who supported a user community felt uncomfortable with their level of security.  However, they 
felt powerless to do anything about it because so much of the responsibility for securing work 
computers lies with the user community.  This was deemed to be further evidence of the need for 
an additional block of questions related to user community awareness of security issues.  
Furthermore, this block of questions was placed ahead of the perceived awareness questions in 
the survey as a way to ameliorate managers’ overall level of concern. 
4.5 Stage 2 Results 
Stage 2 consisted of 25 total responses from workgroup IT managers working at colleges 
and universities throughout the southeastern United States.  Frequency distributions for 
participant age and years of experience in IT by gender are shown in Figures 8 and 9 below. 
 
Figure 8: Frequency of Stage 2 Participants by Age in Years Broken Out by Gender 
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 Figure 9: Frequency of Stage 2 Participants by Years of Experience in IT Broken Out by Gender 
  
The measure asking about participants’ experience with initiating cyberattacks continued to 
be low at this stage of data collection, as evidenced by a mean value of 1.48.  This indicates that 
the majority of managers surveyed stated that they had a little experience or no experience at all 
with initiating cyberattacks.  Because the question contained language that made it clear that 
legitimate hacking, such as might be performed as part of a training program or as a Certified 
Ethical Hacker (CEH), was to be included, the results indicate either a reluctance on the part of 
IT managers to divulge what may be illicit activities or genuine inexperience.  If this trend is also 
seen in stage 3 of this study, it may indicate a possible area of intervention for cybersecurity-
related training.  By holding hacking training where IT managers participate in simulated 
hacking exercises, it may be possible to raise manager’s perceptions of their own cybersecurity 
readiness. 
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Cronbach’s alpha statistics were generated for the 25 cases for all of the constructs listed in 
Table 5 of this dissertation.  The overall statistics, which are presented in Table 12 below, show 
that a majority of the factors show good reliability.  Of the thirteen constructs tested, 10 had 
Cronbach’s alpha values of .70 or above.  The value of .70 is, of course, a guideline for 
demonstrating good reliability among measures.  However, previous MIS researchers have, on 
occasion, adopted lower values.  For example, Siponen et al., adopted a threshold value of .608 
to demonstrate internal reliability of their measures (2010).  In this study, Perceived Awareness 
of Immediate Threat Environment had a Cronbach’s alpha of .663, which indicates that a change 
of wording may be appropriate in future drafts of the survey for some of the questions that are 
associated with this measure. 
Table 12: Cronbach's Alpha Statistics for Stage 2 PACRM Constructs 
Construct Cronbach’s Alpha Cronbach’s 
Alpha Based 
on 
Standardized 
Items 
Number 
of Items 
Level of Previous 
Experience with 
Cybersecurity 
.722 .741 3 
Personal Risk Avoidance 
Score 
.476 .475 3 
Extent of Use of Network 
Activity Monitoring 
Mechanisms 
.939 .939 6 
Extent of Control over 
Physical Access to 
Network Resources 
.805 .814 4 
Extent of Use of 
Preventative Software 
Measures 
.915 .912 12 
Extent of Use of a Backup 
Policy Where Backups are 
Kept Offline 
.876 .879 2 
Degree of User Community 
Awareness of Security 
Issues 
.861 .865 6 
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Perceived Awareness of 
Immediate Threat 
Environment 
.663 .639 4 
Perceived Awareness of 
Vulnerabilities in Physical 
Infrastructure 
.795 .788 5 
Perceived Awareness of 
Defensive Measures in 
Place 
.012 .012 2 
Perceived Readiness to 
Detect Attacks 
.813 .811 3 
Perceived Readiness to 
Prevent Attacks 
.920 .921 4 
Perceived Readiness to 
Recover from Attacks 
.916 .919 3 
 
 The risk measure demonstrated exceedingly poor reliability with a Cronbach’s alpha of 
.476, which indicates that a significant rewording of the questions associated with this measure is 
needed.  In addition, Cronbach’s alpha statistics will need to be generated on the stage 3 data set 
to ensure that all the proposed constructs demonstrate good reliability before proceeding with 
further analysis. 
Lastly, Perceived Awareness of Defensive Measures in Place had a Cronbach’s alpha of 
.012.  There were just two items associated with this measure and on closer inspection, it was 
deemed that they were, in fact, measuring two very different things.  Specifically, the two items 
attempted to capture the IT manager’s level of knowledge and comfort with the defensive 
measures that he or she has in place to keep his or her supported computer resources secure.  
Since the nature of Perceived Awareness of Defensive Measures in Place is, in fact, a measure of 
the IT manager’s level of awareness with the defensive measures that he or she has in place, the 
most prudent course of action is to alter the language of the measure to make that more explicit.  
In that case, the construct should then be retested for reliability before proceeding with further 
analysis. 
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4.6 Roll-Out Phase Overview 
In stage 3 of the project, approximately 160 IT managers who work at the school or 
department level of colleges and universities in other regions of the United States were surveyed.  
This final group of participants represented unit-level IT administration in line with the proposed 
scope of the project.  Due to the complexities of modeling the effects of organizational culture on 
individual behavior, it was not deemed prudent to survey multiple individuals per institution.  
This is especially true given the relatively small number of responses that were collected.  
Therefore, one individual per institution was surveyed to ameliorate the confounding effect of 
observations that are grouped within institutions. 
 To ensure that this procedure was followed, the principal researcher personally contacted 
individuals at colleges and universities via email or phone.  This was necessary to describe the 
nature of the project and to determine whether each potential subject meets the demographic 
specifications of the target population.  The principal researcher then attempted to discern 
whether each potential respondent was a workgroup IT manager who is working at the school or 
department level prior to cultivating the actual survey response.  In this way, the researcher 
sought to ensure a high degree of applicability and appropriateness of the underlying data set.  
Furthermore, the fact that only one response was gathered from each institution hopefully 
guaranteed a broad generalizability of the data. 
4.7 Psychometric Analysis Overview 
Additional Cronbach’s alpha statistics were run on the full stage 3 data set to test whether 
the revised survey displayed good reliability for the complete set of measures.  A Confirmatory 
Factor Analysis (CFA) was then performed to examine the underlying characteristics of the 
measurement model as well as the convergent and discriminant validity of the constructs.  
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4.8 Structural Model Analysis Overview 
Since this is an exploratory study with a limited number of observations, the researcher used 
average scores to represent each of the constructs.  Given the complexity of the conceptual 
model, stage 3 simply did not garner enough observations to allow for a full Structural Equation 
Model (SEM) of the underlying PACRM theoretical and measurement models at the same time.  
However, the previous round of psychometric analysis helped to validate the underlying 
measurement model, so that a full SEM analysis proved redundant at this stage.  Rather, a path 
analysis was conducted to validate the proposed paths. 
4.9 Stage 3 Results 
Stage 3 of the PACRM instrument validation process was conducted over a twenty-two-
week period from mid-January to mid-June of 2018.  During that time, 1,030 individual IT 
administrators who work at 4-year public colleges and universities across the United States were 
contacted through a combination of electronic mail and telephone.  The panel resulted in 161 
survey responses, which represents a final conversion rate of 15.631 percent.  Of the 161 survey 
responses submitted, 26 of them were removed due to partial or incomplete responses.  These 
responses were deleted using listwise deletion.  Therefore, the final stage 3 dataset consisted of 
135 complete responses with no missing data. 
The survey was fully anonymized within the Qualtrics research system so that the researcher 
was unable to match responses to individual panel members beyond the institutional level.  This 
was done intentionally to maintain the maximum practical anonymization of the data at this stage 
of the collection process.  To ensure maximum variability between institutions, only three 
respondents were contacted per institution.  Once the researcher could feasibly rule out the 
potential for duplicate responses arising from the same institution, the distributions were deleted 
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after thirty days, thereby eliminating the researcher’s ability to match responses at the 
institutional level.  Institutions were identified through a database query from the National 
Center for Education Statistics on December 12, 2017 in which the names and web site addresses 
of all 4-year, public higher education institutions in the United States were pulled (National 
Center for Education Statistics). 
As was the case with the Stage 2 results, frequency distributions for participant age and 
years of experience in IT by gender are shown in Figures 10 and 11 below. 
 Figure 10:  Frequency of Stage 3 Participants by Age in Years Broken Out by Gender 
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 Figure 11:  Frequency of Stage 3 Participants by Years of Experience in IT Broken Out by Gender 
 
4.10 Pretest Study Results 
To establish construct validity on the PACRM survey, a CFA was run on the stage 3 dataset 
using the SPSS AMOS statistical package, version 25.  Prior to running the CFA, the 
factorability of the dataset was tested using the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling 
adequacy (KMO MSA) technique.  The KMO MSA statistic showed that the dataset displayed 
good overall factorability with a value of .874. 
The CFA essentially tests the measurement model listed in Table 5 of this dissertation.  It 
tests the pattern of relationships between the measurement model and the latent constructs 
hypothesized.  Prior to running the CFA, however, Cronbach’s alpha statistics were once again 
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Table 13 below, show that all the factors displayed good reliability, as denoted by a Cronbach’s 
alpha of .70 or above. 
Table 13: Cronbach's Alpha Statistics for Stage 3 PACRM Constructs 
Construct Cronbach’s Alpha Cronbach’s 
Alpha Based 
on 
Standardized 
Items 
Number 
of Items 
Level of Previous 
Experience with 
Cybersecurity 
.700 .741 3 
Personal Risk Avoidance 
Score 
.766 .765 3 
Extent of Use of Network 
Activity Monitoring 
Mechanisms 
.929 .929 6 
Extent of Control over 
Physical Access to 
Network Resources 
.775 .776 4 
Extent of Use of 
Preventative Software 
Measures 
.905 .906 12 
Extent of Use of a Backup 
Policy Where Backups are 
Kept Offline 
.826 .832 2 
Degree of User Community 
Awareness of Security 
Issues 
.883 .884 6 
Perceived Awareness of 
Immediate Threat 
Environment 
.904 .904 4 
Perceived Awareness of 
Vulnerabilities in Physical 
Infrastructure 
.882 .886 4 
Perceived Awareness of 
Defensive Measures in 
Place 
.814 .820 2 
Perceived Readiness to 
Detect Attacks 
.889 .891 3 
Perceived Readiness to 
Prevent Attacks 
.908 .908 4 
Perceived Readiness to 
Recover from Attacks 
.888 .891 3 
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 As stated above, the CFA is based on the survey responses from 135 workgroup IT 
managers who work at institutions of higher learning across the United States.  Since the number 
of observations in the dataset was lower than what would be needed for a full-scale analysis, the 
full measurement model was subdivided into three subset models of theoretically related factors 
(Bentler & Chou, 1987).  These factor groups were the four practice related factors enumerated 
above together with the previous experience and risk factors, the three awareness factors, and the 
user community awareness factor.  In each sub-model, the group of factors were tested in 
relation to the three response factors, which represent the IT manager’s perceived readiness to 
detect, prevent, and recover from a cyberattack. 
Kline (2005) suggests that appropriate model fit indices to include from a CFA are the Chi-
Square test, the Comparative Fit Index (CFI), the Root Mean Square Error of Approximation 
(RMSEA), and the Standardized Root Mean Square Residual (SRMR). The Chi-Square (𝜒ଶ) 
statistic has been the traditional parameter for making judgements about the acceptability of 
model fit (Hu & Bentler, 1999).  A good fitting model would result in an insignificant result at 
the .05 threshold.  There are, however, a number of severe restrictions on its use.  Primarily, 
departures from multivariate normality in the data may result in model rejections even in models 
that are properly specified (Hooper et al., 2008).  Secondly, Chi-Square is sensitive to sample 
size.  Therefore, the Chi-Square statistic nearly always rejects the model where datasets are large 
enough (Bentler & Bonett, 1980).  For these reasons, alternative fit statistics have been sought 
out.  One such statistic is the Chi-Square to degrees of freedom ratio (Wheaton et al., 1977).  
Generally speaking, a chi-square/d.f. ratio of less than 3.0 indicates an acceptable level of fit 
(Marsh et al., 2004), although values as high as 5.0 (Wheaton et al., 1977) and as low as 2.0 
(Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007) have also been argued for. 
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 The Comparative Fit Index (Bentler P. , 1990) is a revised form of the Normed Fit Index 
(NFI) that takes into account sample size.  Compared with the NFI, the CFI performs well even 
when sample size is small (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007).  As with the NFI, CFI values range from 
zero to 1.0 with values closer to 1.0 indicating good model fit.  A cut-off point greater than .90 
has been generally been accepted as the standard needed to ensure that misspecified models are 
not accepted (Hu & Bentler, 1999).  Finally, the Standardized Root Mean Square Residual 
(SRMR) index indicates the difference between the square root of the residuals of the sample 
covariance matrix and the hypothesized covariance model (Kline, 2005).  As with the Root Mean 
Square Error Approximation (RMSEA), values below .06 indicate a good model fit.  However, it 
has been argued that values as high as .08 are acceptable for both statistics (Hu & Bentler, 1999). 
4.11 Subset Model 1: Practice Related Factors 
Four Extent of Use constructs were originally hypothesized.  These included Extent of Use 
of Network Activity Monitoring Mechanisms, Extent of Control over Physical Access to Network 
Resources, Extent of Use of Preventative Software Measures, and Extent of Use of a Backup 
Policy Where Backups are Kept Offline.  These four factors were placed into a CFA model 
together with the Level of Previous Experience with Cybersecurity and Personal Risk Avoidance 
constructs, since these six constructs were hypothesized to have relationships with the dependent 
factors, as illustrated in Figures 1 and 6 of this dissertation.  Upon examing the factor loadings, it 
was determined that five measurement variables could be dropped from further analysis since 
these variables had loadings on their respective factors that were less than the traditional .5 
threshold.  Furthermore, it was clear from the initial loadings that the Extent of Use of 
Preventative Software Measures was, in fact, a combination of two latent factors.  Three of the 
measurement variables (the ones related to software preventative measures) loaded together as a 
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group while the remaining six variables (the ones related to frequency of use of preventative 
measures) loaded as a noticably distinct second group on the factor.  Therefore, a new CFA was 
performed, which reflected these loadings.  The Chi-Square to degrees of freedom ratio was 
2.573 (𝜒ଶ=1325.042, d.f.=515), with a CFI of .809, and an SRMR of .0754.  Table 14 lists the 
CFA measurement variables and their related constructs along with the variables that were 
dropped after the initial analysis due to low factor loadings. 
Table 14: Practice Related Factors and their Associated Measurement Variables 
Construct Drop Item 
Number 
Standardized 
Regression 
Weight 
Level of 
Previous 
Experience 
with 
Cybersecurity 
drop PE.3 .412 
 PE4.1 .873 
 PE4.2 .667 
Personal Risk 
Avoidance 
Score 
 D8.1 .594 
 D8.2 .813 
 D8.3 .679 
Extent of Use 
of Network 
Activity 
Monitoring 
Mechanisms 
 EU1.1 .744 
 EU1.2 .785 
 EU1.3 .736 
 EU2.1 .905 
 EU2.2 .944 
 EU2.3 .854 
Extent of 
Control over 
Physical 
Access to 
Network 
Resources 
 EU1.4 .893 
 EU1.5 .861 
drop EU1.6 .362 
 EU2.4 .722 
Extent of Use 
of 
Preventative 
Software 
Measures 
drop EU1.7 .435 
drop EU1.8 .449 
drop EU1.9 .464 
 EU1.10 .931 
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 EU1.11 .764 
 EU1.12 .762 
Frequency of 
Use of 
Preventative 
Measures 
 EU2.5 .514 
 EU2.6 .920 
 EU2.7 .927 
 EU2.8 .871 
 EU2.9 .805 
 EU2.10 .750 
Extent of Use 
of a Backup 
Policy Where 
Backups are 
Kept Offline  
 EU1.13 .729 
 EU2.11 .985 
Perceived 
Readiness to 
Detect 
Attacks 
 PR1.1 .824 
 PR1.2 .909 
 PR2.1 .833 
Perceived 
Readiness to 
Prevent 
Attacks 
 PR1.3 .946 
 PR1.4 .885 
 PR2.2 .800 
 PR2.3 .813 
Perceived 
Readiness to 
Recover from 
Attacks  
 
 PR1.5 .832 
 PR2.4 .869 
 PR2.5 .881 
 
4.12 Subset Model 2: Awareness Related Factors 
The second CFA tested the construct validity of the awareness group of factors from the 
original PACRM measurement model.  The factors that were included in this group included 
Perceived Awareness of the Immediate Threat Environment, Perceived Awareness of 
Vulnerabilities in the Physical Infrastructure, and Perceived Awareness of the Defensive 
Measures in Place.  As was the case with subset model 1, these three factors were put into a 
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CFA with the three perceived readiness constructs.  The resulting CFA had a Chi-Square to d.f. 
ratio of 4.587 (𝜒ଶ=711.009, d.f.=155), CFI of .807, and SRMR of .0649.  No measurement 
variables were dropped after the initial CFA on subset model 2 because there were none that had 
standardized loadings of less than .5 on their respective factors.  Table 15 lists the CFA 
measurement variables and their related constructs. 
Table 15: Awareness Related Factors and their Associated Measurement Variables 
Construct Drop Item 
Number 
Standardized 
Regression 
Weight 
Perceived 
Awareness of 
Immediate 
Threat 
Environment  
 PA1.1 .853 
 PA1.2 .831 
 PA2.1 .872 
 PA2.2 .799 
Perceived 
Awareness of 
Vulnerabilities 
in the Physical 
Infrastructure 
 PA1.3 .751 
 PA1.4 .820 
 PA2.3 .840 
 PA2.4 .846 
Perceived 
Awareness of 
Defensive 
Measures in 
Place 
 PA1.5 .829 
 PA2.5 .836 
Perceived 
Readiness to 
Detect Attacks 
 PR1.1 .797 
 PR1.2 .882 
 PR2.1 .872 
Perceived 
Readiness to 
Prevent 
Attacks 
 PR1.3 .901 
 PR1.4 .856 
 PR2.2 .799 
 PR2.3 .818 
Perceived 
Readiness to 
 PR1.5 .802 
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Recover from 
Attacks  
 
 PR2.4 .894 
 PR2.5 .891 
 
4.13 Subset Model 3: User Community Awareness Factor 
The final subset model that was tested was Degree of User Community Awareness of 
Security Issues.  As was the case with the previous sub-models, the three perceived readiness 
factors were included in the analysis.  The resulting CFA had a Chi-Square to d.f. ratio of 3.405 
(𝜒ଶ=333.653, d.f.=98), a CFI of .867, and an SRMR of .0761.  No measurement variables were 
dropped after the initial CFA on subset model 3 because there were none that had standardized 
loadings of less than .5 on their respective factors.  Table 16 lists the CFA measurement 
variables and their related constructs. 
Table 16: User Community Awareness of Security Issues Factor and Associated Measurement Variables 
Construct Drop Item 
Number 
Standardized 
Regression 
Weight 
Degree of User 
Community 
Awareness of 
Security Issues  
 ED1.1 .774 
 ED1.2 .687 
 ED1.3 .835 
 ED1.4 .844 
 ED1.5 .609 
 ED1.6 .745 
Perceived 
Readiness to 
Detect Attacks 
 PR1.1 .808 
 PR1.2 .876 
 PR2.1 .871 
Perceived 
Readiness to 
Prevent 
Attacks 
 PR1.3 .890 
 PR1.4 .850 
 PR2.2 .815 
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 PR2.3 .823 
Perceived 
Readiness to 
Recover from 
Attacks  
 
 PR1.5 .818 
 PR2.4 .881 
 PR2.5 .888 
 
4.14 Methodology Summary 
This chapter provided an overview of the methodology that was undertaken to validate the 
PACRM survey instrument.  Over the course of approximately nine months, three distinct stages 
of instrument validation stages took place.  The first two stages comprised the pilot test phase in 
which both qualitative interviews and a pilot study were conducted on the proposed PACRM 
survey.  This phase helped to establish the content validity of the survey instrument.  In addition, 
reliability statistics were generated on the initial pilot test data (n=25) gathered from IT 
administrators working at 4-year public colleges and universities in the southeastern United 
States.  These reliability statistics showed that several of the survey items needed to be reworked 
in subsequent drafts of the PACRM survey.   
Stage 3 of the instrument validation process consisted of a larger study of 161 workgroup IT 
managers at colleges and universities across the United States.  The construct validity of the 
survey items was aided by another round of reliability testing in which all of the PACRM 
constructs were found to have good reliability, as denoted by Cronbach’s alphas of .70 or above.  
Futhermore, Confirmatory Factor Analyses were conducted using the IBM SPSS Amos software, 
version 25.  The original PACRM measurement model, outlined in Table 5 of this dissertation, 
was divided into three, theory-related submodels, each specifying a different group of factors 
from within the larger PACRM measurement model.  These analyses resulted in several of the 
measurement variables being dropped due to low factor loadings.  In addition, Extent of Use of 
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Preventative Software Measures was found to actually be a confounding of two, distinct latent 
variables.  It was partitioned out accordingly and each of the associated measurement variables 
were found to load highly on their respective factors.  Admittedly, the fit indices for each of the 
sub-models are not great, although they are close to the traditional accepted boundaries.  This is, 
in some ways, to be expected as the individual sub-models by no means represent the most 
parsimonious or complete solutions. 
 In the next chapter, the three submodels were recombined into a new, more parsimonious 
full measurement model.  A new Confirmatory Factor Analysis was then performed on the full 
model and the constructs were examined for evidence of convergent and discriminant validity.  
Finally, the path analysis was conducted in IBM SPSS Amos using the participants’ averaged 
scores from the measurement variables to represent the latent constructs.  
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5 RESULTS 
 
5.1 Confirmatory Factor Analysis of Full Measurement Model Results 
In order to ensure a good parameter estimate to observation ratio (Vorhies & Morgan, 2005), 
the full PACRM measurement model was divided into three subsets of theoretically related 
submodels (Bentler & Chou, 1987).  Due to the low number of observations relative to the 
complexity of the overall model, this was done in the model trimming stage so that measurement 
variables that did not load well on their respective factors could more easily be identified.  In this 
way, five measurement variables were dropped from further analysis due to loadings that were 
below the .5 threshold on their respective factors.  In addition, Extent of Use of Preventative 
Software Measures was divided into two distinct latent factors.  The first, Extent of Use of 
Preventative Software Measures, contains three measurement variables while the second, 
Frequency of Use of Preventative Measures, contains six measurement variables. 
As the next step in the CFA process, the three submodels were recombined into a full 
measurement model and a new CFA was performed using the stage 3 dataset of 135 
observations.  The CFA had a Chi-Square to d.f. ratio of 2.274 (𝜒ଶ=2575.918, d.f.=1133), a 
Comparative Fit Index of .778, an RMSEA value of .097, and a Standardized Root Mean Square 
Residual value of .0782.  None of these values represent a good model fit although the Chi-
Square to d.f. ratio and SRMR values are within traditional boundaries for acceptable model fit 
for those statistics (Marsh et al., 2004; Hu & Bentler, 1999).
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5.2 Convergent/Discriminant Validity of Full Measurement Model Results 
Convergent validity is the agreement between measures of the same construct while 
discriminant validity is the distinctiveness between different constructs (Campbell & Fiske, 
1959).  Table 17 lists the validity and reliability statistics for all of the constructs in the full 
measurement model. 
Table 17: Validity and Reliability Statistics for the Full Measurement Model Constructs 
 CR AVE MSV MaxR(H) 
UsrCommA  0.886  0.568  0.183  0.899 
PrevExpe  0.750  0.604  0.291  0.801 
NwActMon  0.931  0.694  0.432  0.950 
PhysCtrl  0.867  0.687  0.473  0.885 
PrvSWMea  0.861  0.676  0.265  0.902 
FrPrvMea  0.918  0.658  0.567  0.947 
RgOffBck  0.854  0.749  0.567  0.964 
PRDetect  0.888  0.727  0.880  0.895 
PRPrevnt  0.908  0.712  0.880  0.917 
PRRecovr  0.898  0.746  0.740  0.905 
RskAvoid  0.741  0.492  0.250  0.772 
AwarThrt  0.906  0.707  0.876  0.911 
AwarVuln  0.888  0.664  0.996  0.891 
AwarDefM  0.819  0.694  0.996  0.820 
 
As seen by the Composite Reliability (CR) column, all of the constructs show good overall 
reliability.  The Average Variance Extracted (AVE), which measures the average amount of 
variance in the measurement variables explained by their respective constructs, is an indication 
of convergent validity.  As can be seen in Table 17, the AVE for each of the factors except 
Personal Risk Avoidance are above the .5 treshold.  This indicates that the constructs in the 
PACRM measurement model were generally successful in accounting for more than half of the 
observed variance in the measurement variables.  The low AVE value for the Personal Risk 
Avoidance factor is the one exception to this pattern.  However, given the fact that this construct 
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shows both good reliability and discriminant validity, it is not overally problematic for the 
analysis. 
Of greater concern is the fact that Perceived Readiness to Detect an Attack and Perceived 
Readiness to Prevent an Attack show a degree of discriminant validity violations with one 
another.  This can be seen in Table 17 by the fact that the AVE is less than the Maximum Shared 
Variance (MSV) for each of these factors.  This indicates that there is some correlation between 
the two constructs.  This also seems to be the case with the three awareness-related factors.  All 
three constructs, Perceived Awareness of the Immediate Threat Environment, Perceived 
Awareness of Vulnerabilities in the Physical Infrastructure, and Perceived Awareness of 
Defensive Measures seem to be highly correlated with one another.  These correlations are 
readily apparent in the Factor Correlation Matrix, shown in Table 18 below. 
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Table 18: Factor Correlation Table  
 UsrCom
mA 
Prev
Expe 
NwA
ctMo
n 
Phys
Ctrl 
PrvS
WM
ea 
FrPr
vMe
a 
RgO
ffBc
k 
PRD
etect 
PRP
revn
t 
PRR
ecov
r 
Rsk
Avoi
d 
Awa
rThr
t 
Awa
rVul
n 
Awa
rDef
M 
Usr
Com
mA 
0.754              
Prev
Expe 0.066 0.777             
NwA
ctMo
n 
0.096 0.536 0.833            
Phys
Ctrl 0.189 0.442 0.569 0.829           
PrvS
WM
ea 
0.177 0.166 0.249 0.451 0.822          
FrPr
vMe
a 
0.160 0.415 0.657 0.688 0.515 0.811         
RgO
ffBc
k 
0.073 0.405 0.618 0.687 0.438 0.753 0.866        
PRD
etect 0.366 0.420 0.623 0.661 0.499 0.566 0.491 0.852       
PRP
revn
t 
0.428 0.472 0.582 0.598 0.418 0.542 0.452 0.938 0.844      
PRR
ecov
r 
0.353 0.483 0.512 0.646 0.437 0.516 0.500 0.843 0.860 0.864     
Rsk
Avoi
d 
0.068 -0.500 
-
0.231 
-
0.096 0.024 
-
0.271 
-
0.161 
-
0.181 
-
0.095 
-
0.124 0.701    
Awa
rThr
t 
0.352 0.539 0.598 0.606 0.296 0.481 0.479 0.708 0.708 0.584 -0.092 0.841   
Awa
rVul
n 
0.394 0.498 0.600 0.667 0.378 0.546 0.501 0.840 0.782 0.739 -0.063 0.936 0.815  
Awa
rDef
M 
0.305 0.438 0.606 0.608 0.407 0.568 0.541 0.868 0.769 0.718 -0.032 0.901 0.998 0.833 
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In order to determine the source of the factor correlation, the factor score weights for each of 
the constructs were examined.  Upon closer inspection, it was found that there was significant 
cross-loading between Perceived Awareness of Vulnerabilities in the Physical Infrastructure and 
Perceived Awareness of Defensive Measures, such that all of their measurement variables loaded 
highly on both constructs. 
Table 19: Factor Loadings for Three Perceived Awareness Constructs  
Item Number Expected 
Factor 
Actual 
Factor 
Perceived 
Awareness 
of Defensive 
Measures 
Perceived 
Awareness of 
Vulnerabilities 
in the Physical 
Infrastructure 
Perceived 
Awareness 
of the 
Immediate 
Threat 
Environment 
PA1.1 AwarThrt AwarThrt .066 .075 .202 
PA1.2 AwarThrt AwarThrt .059 .067 .182 
PA1.3 AwarVuln AwarVuln .053 .079 .044 
PA1.4 AwarVuln AwarVuln .072 .108 .060 
PA1.5 AwarDefM AwarDefM .106 .077 .051 
PA2.1 AwarThrt AwarThrt .055 .063 .169 
PA2.2 AwarThrt AwarThrt .037 .042 .113 
PA2.3 AwarVuln AwarVuln .091 .136 .075 
PA2.4 AwarVuln AwarVuln .091 .136 .075 
PA2.5 AwarDefM AwarDefM .134 .099 .065 
 
This result was not theorized and so it is difficult to discern exactly what second-order factor 
is causing the cross-loadings between these two factors.  An educated guess can be made that the 
four measurement variables, which attempted to assess the IT manager’s knowledge and 
awareness of his or her organizational unit’s network physical design and vulnerability to attack, 
were actually read by participants as indicators of their preparedness for a cyberattack.  
Similarly, the two survey items that questioned the IT managers on their knowledge and 
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awareness of any defensive measures that were in place to protect their networks may also have 
been read by study participants as indicators of their preparedness. 
The factor loadings also show that the high correlation between Perceived Readiness to 
Detect Attacks and Perceived Readiness to Prevent Attacks were caused by items cross-loading 
between these two factors, although not to the degree seen in the perceived awareness constructs.  
Table 20 has the factor loadings for the three perceived readiness constructs, along with their 
measurement variables. 
Table 20: Factor Loadings for Three Perceived Readiness Constructs  
Item Number Expected 
Factor 
Actual 
Factor 
Perceived 
Readiness 
to Recover 
from an 
Attack 
Perceived 
Readiness to 
Prevent 
Attacks 
Perceived 
Readiness to 
Detect 
Attacks 
PR1.1 PRDetect PRDetect .014 .058 .084 
PR1.2 PRDetect PRDetect .023 .095 .136 
PR1.3 PRPrevnt PRPrevnt .063 .241 .111 
PR1.4 PRPrevnt PRPrevnt .038 .147 .067 
PR1.5 PRRecovr PRRecovr .137 .025 .011 
PR2.1 PRDetect PRDetect .020 .084 .121 
PR2.2 PRPrevnt PRPrevnt .028 .106 .048 
PR2.3 PRPrevnt PRPrevnt .029 .110 .050 
PR2.4 PRRecovr PRRecovr .277 .051 .021 
PR2.5 PRRecovr PRRecovr .263 .049 .020 
 
The measurement variables all loaded on their expected factors.  However, the items 
pertaining to the IT manager’s perceived ability to detect if his or her computer resources were 
being used in support of illicit activities and the item related to his or her readiness to detect if a 
computer resource had been hacked, both loaded highly on Perceived Readiness to Detect 
Attacks and Perceived Readiness to Prevent Attacks.  It may be that the specificity of these two 
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questions triggered a prevention response in the minds of the IT administrators, in addition to the 
detect response that was theorized. 
Table 21 lists the complete set of measurement variables that were used in the final 
measurement model, together with their respective regression weights. 
Table 21: Full Measurement Model Constructs with Their Associated Measurement Variables 
Construct Item 
Number 
Item 
Description 
Standardized 
Regression 
Weight 
Level of 
Previous 
Experience 
with 
Cybersecurity 
PE4.1 Indicate your level of previous 
experience with each of the following 
items: Preventing or stopping 
cyberattacks? 
.874 
PE4.2 Indicate your level of previous 
experience with each of the following 
items: Initiating cyberattacks? (Either 
as part of an advanced cybersecurity 
certification training program, or as a 
Certified Ethical Hacker, or on your 
own) 
.666 
Personal Risk 
Avoidance 
Score 
D8.1 Indicate your level of agreement to 
each of the following items: In 
general, I try to avoid risk whenever 
possible at work. 
.606 
D8.2 Indicate your level of agreement to 
each of the following items: I am not 
comfortable accepting risk in matters 
related to my job. 
.818 
D8.3 Indicate your level of agreement to 
each of the following items: I am not 
comfortable accepting risk when it 
comes to the information security of 
my department. 
.663 
Extent of Use of 
Network 
Activity 
Monitoring 
Mechanisms 
EU1.1 Indicate the extent to which you use 
each of the following items for the 
technology in your unit: Network 
activity logging mechanisms to 
monitor network activity? 
.749 
Extent of Use of 
Network 
Activity 
Monitoring 
EU1.2 Indicate the extent to which you use 
each of the following items for the 
technology in your unit:  Intrusion 
Detection Systems (IDS) and/or 
.791 
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Mechanisms 
(cont.) 
Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPS) on 
your network? 
EU1.3 Indicate the extent to which you use 
each of the following items for the 
technology in your unit:  Sensor 
deployments and/or traffic analyzers 
for your network? 
.742 
EU2.1 Indicate the frequency for which each 
of following items is true for the 
technology in your unit: You monitor 
general network activity logs for signs 
of suspicious network activity? 
.904 
EU2.2 Indicate the frequency for which each 
of following items is true for the 
technology in your unit: You check 
the probing and/or block reports from 
any Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) 
and/or Intrusion Prevention Systems 
(IPS) on your network? 
.941 
EU2.3 Indicate the frequency for which each 
of following items is true for the 
technology in your unit: You analyze 
reports or data from a sensor 
deployment (e.g., honeypots, traffic 
analyzers other than your IDS/IPS, 
etc.) for your network? 
.852 
Extent of 
Control over 
Physical 
Access to 
Network 
Resources  
EU1.4 Indicate the extent to which you use 
each of the following items for the 
technology in your unit:  Physical 
controls to prevent unauthorized 
physical access to network and server 
resources? 
.894 
EU1.5 Indicate the extent to which you use 
each of the following items for the 
technology in your unit:  Locked 
rooms and/or server cabinets to secure 
servers or other vital computer 
resources? 
.853 
Extent of 
Control over 
Physical 
Access to 
Network 
Resources 
(cont.) 
EU2.4 Indicate the frequency for which each 
of following items is true for the 
technology in your unit: You control 
unauthorized access to server and 
network resources? 
.731 
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Extent of Use of 
Preventative 
Software 
Measures 
EU1.10 Indicate the extent to which you use 
each of the following items for the 
technology in your unit:  Computers 
that are protected with antivirus 
software?  
.930 
EU1.11 Indicate the extent to which you use 
each of the following items for the 
technology in your unit:  Computers 
that are protected with anti-malware 
software? 
.765 
EU1.12 Indicate the extent to which you use 
each of the following items for the 
technology in your unit:  Computers 
that are protected by one or more 
firewalls?  
.763 
Frequency of 
Use of 
Preventative 
Measures 
EU2.5 Please indicate the frequency for 
which each of following is true for the 
equipment in your unit:  You require 
authorized users to change their 
passwords? 
.516 
EU2.6 Please indicate the frequency for 
which each of following is true for the 
equipment in your unit:  You update 
antivirus definitions for the computers 
in your school or department?  
.917 
EU2.7 Please indicate the frequency for 
which each of following is true for the 
equipment in your unit:  You update 
the anti-malware settings to reflect 
current or emerging threats?  
.925 
Frequency of 
Use of 
Preventative 
Measures 
(cont.) 
 
EU2.8 Please indicate the frequency for 
which each of following is true for the 
equipment in your unit:  You update 
the firewall settings to reflect current 
or emerging threats?  
.875 
EU2.9 Please indicate the frequency for 
which each of following is true for the 
equipment in your unit:  You update 
the firewall setting to allow approved 
applications to access the network?  
.809 
EU2.10 Please indicate the frequency for 
which each of following is true for the 
equipment in your unit:  You run 
critical software and operating system 
updates on computers? 
.750 
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Extent of Use of 
a Backup 
Policy Where 
Backups are 
Kept Offline 
EU1.13 Indicate the extent to which you use 
each of the following items for the 
technology in your unit:  Regular 
backups of servers or other vital 
computer resources that are then kept 
offline? 
.731 
EU2.11 Please indicate the frequency for 
which each of following is true for the 
equipment in your unit:  You back up 
servers or vital computer resources 
according to a backup policy that 
requires offline storage of backups? 
.983 
Degree of User 
Community 
Awareness of 
Security Issues 
ED1.1 Please indicate the extent to which 
you feel that the user community you 
support is educated about the 
following topics related to information 
security:  The need to update their 
work computer's operating system 
and/or applications whenever a new 
update becomes available?  
.783 
Degree of User 
Community 
Awareness of 
Security Issues 
(cont.) 
ED1.2 Please indicate the extent to which 
you feel that the user community you 
support is educated about the 
following topics related to information 
security:  The need to update their 
antivirus definitions whenever a new 
update becomes available?  
.693 
ED1.3 Please indicate the extent to which 
you feel that the user community you 
support is educated about the 
following topics related to information 
security:  The need to exercise caution 
when using USB drives or external 
hard drives, which they have 
previously used outside the 
workplace, on a school or department 
computer?  
.833 
ED1.4 Please indicate the extent to which 
you feel that the user community you 
support is educated about the 
following topics related to information 
security:  The need to exercise caution 
when downloading or installing 
software or apps from untrusted 
sources onto their work computers?  
.839 
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ED1.5 Please indicate the extent to which 
you feel that the user community you 
support is educated about the 
following topics related to information 
security:  The need to exercise caution 
when engaging in conversations that 
could divulge sensitive information to 
unauthorized personnel, such as is 
common in social-engineering type 
situations?  
.611 
Degree of User 
Community 
Awareness of 
Security Issues 
(cont.) 
ED1.6 Please indicate the extent to which 
you feel that the user community you 
support is educated about the 
following topics related to information 
security:  The need to exercise caution 
when opening email attachments and 
clickable links in email?  
.736 
Perceived 
Awareness of 
the Immediate 
Threat 
Environment 
PA1.1 How do you rate your level of 
knowledge for each of the following 
for the equipment in your school or 
department:  The volume and type of 
network traffic that takes place on 
your network? 
.885 
PA1.2 How do you rate your level of 
knowledge for each of the following 
for the equipment in your school or 
department:  The nature and type of 
network traffic on any networks that 
connect with yours? 
.870 
PA2.1 Rate your level of awareness for each 
of the following items regarding the 
technology in your unit:  The type of 
network traffic on your department 
network? 
.837 
PA2.2 Rate your level of awareness for each 
of the following items regarding the 
technology in your unit:  The type of 
network traffic on your department 
network? 
.767 
Perceived 
Awareness of 
Vulnerabilities 
in the Physical 
Infrastructure 
PA1.3 Rate your level of knowledge for each 
of the following items for the 
technology in your unit:  The 
vulnerability of your computers and 
network equipment to a cyberattack?  
.764 
PA1.4 Rate your level of knowledge for each 
of the following items for the 
.832 
 90 
technology in your unit:  The physical 
design and layout of your network?  
Perceived 
Awareness of 
Vulnerabilities 
in the Physical 
Infrastructure 
(cont.) 
PA2.3 Rate your level of awareness for each 
of the following items regarding the 
technology in your unit:  The number 
and severity of potential 
vulnerabilities on your network? 
.829 
PA2.4 Rate your level of awareness for each 
of the following items regarding the 
technology in your unit:  The overall 
physical infrastructure of your 
network? 
.833 
Perceived 
Awareness of 
Defensive 
Measures in 
Place 
PA1.5 Rate your level of knowledge for each 
of the following items for the 
technology in your unit:  The type of 
defensive measures that are currently 
protecting your network? 
.83 
PA2.5 Rate your level of awareness for each 
of the following items regarding the 
technology in your unit:  The 
defensive measures that protect your 
network? 
.835 
Perceived 
Readiness to 
Detect Attacks 
PR1.1 Rate your ability in relation to each of 
the following items for the technology 
in your unit:  To detect whether a 
computer or network resource has 
been compromised by malware? 
.812 
PR1.2 Rate your ability in relation to each of 
the following items for the technology 
in your unit:  To detect whether a 
computer or network resource is being 
used in support of an illegal activity 
such as a Distributed Denial of 
Service (DDoS) attack? 
.903 
PR2.1 Rate your readiness to address each of 
the following for the equipment in 
your school or department:  To detect 
whether a computer or network 
resource has been hacked? 
.847 
Perceived 
Readiness to 
Prevent 
Attacks 
PR1.3 Rate your ability in relation to each of 
the following items for the technology 
in your unit:  The vulnerability of your 
computers and network equipment to 
a cyberattack? 
.906 
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PR1.4 Rate your ability in relation to each of 
the following items for the technology 
in your unit:  The physical design and 
layout of your network? 
.857 
PR2.2 Rate your readiness to address each of 
the following for the equipment in 
your school or department:  To 
prevent a ransom ware attack from 
limiting users’ ability to access data 
resources? 
.799 
PR2.3 Rate your readiness to address each of 
the following for the equipment in 
your school or department:  To 
prevent a ransom ware attack from 
encrypting servers or sensitive data 
resources such as data that falls under 
FERPA or HIPPA regulations? 
.809 
Perceived 
Readiness to 
Recover From 
Attacks 
PR1.5 Rate your ability in relation to each of 
the following items for the technology 
in your unit:  To recover users’ access 
to vital computer resources in the 
event of a ransom ware attack without 
paying the ransom? 
.809 
PR2.4 Rate your readiness to address each of 
the following for the equipment in 
your school or department:  To 
recover data resources after they have 
been fully or partially erased by a 
computer virus? 
.886 
PR2.5 Rate your readiness to address each of 
the following for the equipment in 
your school or department:  To 
recover data resources after they have 
been encrypted by a ransom ware?  
.893 
 
5.3 Path Model Diagram and Results 
After the measurement model was validated, a path analysis that used the participants’ 
average scores on the measurement variables to represent each factor was conducted.  Table 22 
lists the mean and standard deviations for all the participants’ scores averaged across factors.  
Survey items were coded according to a Likert-type scale.  All survey items were corrected prior 
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to analysis to correspond with the traditional format of 1 equaling “strongly disagree” and 5 
equaling “strongly agree”. 
Table 22: Means and Standard Deviations for averaged participants’ scores 
Factor Label Factor Description N Mean S.D. 
PrevExpe Previous Experience 135 2.111 .87389 
RskAvoid Risk Avoidance 135 3.6741 .97860 
NwActMon Extent of Use of Network Activity 
Monitoring Activities 
135 2.6741 1.19751 
PhysCtrl Extent of Use of Physical Control over 
Computer and Network Resources 
135 3.7630 1.22364 
PrvSWMea Extent of Use of Preventative Software 
Measures 
135 4.4617 .81343 
FrPrvMeas Frequency of Use of Preventative 
Measures 
135 3.7272 1.22298 
RgOffBck Extent of Use of Regular Offline 
Backups 
135 3.7889 1.33616 
UsrCommA User Community Awareness of IT 
Security Issues 
135 3.2679 .90239 
AwarThrt Perceived Awareness of the Immediate 
Threat Environment 
135 3.2926 1.08007 
AwarVuln Perceived Awareness of Vulnerabilities 
in the Physical Infrastructure 
135 3.5722 1.03207 
AwarDefM Perceived Awareness of the Defensive 
Measures Protecting Computer 
Resources 
135 3.6704 1.06358 
PRDetect Perceived Readiness to Detect 
Cyberattacks 
135 3.6840 1.10202 
PRPrevnt Perceived Readiness to Prevent 
Cyberattacks 
135 3.3685 1.05264 
PRRecovr Perceived Readiness to Recover from a 
Cyberattack 
135 3.5926 1.14291 
 
Figures 12 and 13 below show the full PACRM path model, first with the hypothesized 
relationships (Fig. 12) and then with the results (Fig. 13). 
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Figure 12:  PACRM Path Model with Hypothesized Relationships 
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 Figure 13:  PACRM Path Model Results 
 *** denotes significance at the .001 level 
 ** denotes significance at the .01 level 
 * denotes significance at the .05 level 
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Figure 14: PACRM Path Model Results when Risk Avoidance and Interaction Term are Removed 
 *** denotes significance at the .001 level 
 ** denotes significance at the .01 level 
 * denotes significance at the .05 level 
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Table 23: PACRM Path Model Results with Risk and Interaction Term Included 
Hypothesis 
# 
Regression Path Param. 
Value 
S.E. Critical 
Value 
P 
H1 Experience  Network Activity Monitoring .551 .352 1.565 .118 
H2 Experience  Physical Control .323 .372 .869 .385 
H3 Experience  Prev. Software Measures .277 .265 1.046 .296 
H4 Experience  Freq. Preventative Measures .233 .375 .622 .534 
H5 Experience  Regular Offline Backups .463 .418 1.106 .269 
H6 Risk/Exp. Interaction  Network Act Mon .020 .098 .199 .842 
H7 Risk/Exp. Interaction  Physical Control .083 .104 .794 .427 
H8 Risk/Exp. Interaction  Prev. Software -.028 .074 -.376 .707 
H9 Risk/Exp. Interaction  Freq. Prev. Meas. .074 .105 .705 .481 
H10 Risk/Exp. Interaction  Reg. Offline Back. .023 .117 .193 .847 
H11 Risk  Network Activity Monitoring -.083 .244 -.340 .734 
H12 Risk  Physical Control -.025 .258 -.095 .924 
H13 Risk  Prev. Software Measures .156 .184 .847 .397 
H14 Risk  Freq. Preventative Measures -.250 .261 -.958 .338 
H15 Risk  Regular Offline Backups .062 .291 .212 .832 
H16 Network Act. Mon.  Readiness to Detect .318 .064 4.941 <.001 
H17 Physical Control  Readiness to Prevent .042 .052 .811 .417 
H18 Prev. Soft. Mea.  Readiness to Prevent .119 .073 1.637 .102 
H19 Freq. Prev. Meas.  Readiness to Prevent .078 .051 1.509 .131 
H20 Reg. Offline Back  Readiness to Recover .344 .065 5.305 <.001 
H21 Awar. Immed. Thrt  Readiness to Detect .379 .063 5.991 <.001 
H22 Awar. Immed. Thrt  Readiness to Prevent .022 .105 .208 .835 
H23 Awar. Vulnerabilities  Readiness to Prev. .280 .130 2.151 .031 
H24 Awar. Defensive Mea.  Readiness to Prv. .216 .106 2.042 .041 
H25 Usr. Comm. Aware.  Readiness to Detect .219 .076 2.899 .004 
H26 Usr. Comm. Aware.  Readiness to Prevnt. .238 .065 3.677 <.001 
 
5.4 Discussion 
Table 24 lists the hypotheses and whether they were supported by the results of the path 
analysis. 
Table 24: List of Hypotheses and whether they were supported with Risk and Interaction Term Included 
Hypothesis 
# 
Regression Path Supported 
H1 Experience  Network Activity Monitoring NO 
H2 Experience  Physical Control NO 
H3 Experience  Prev. Software Measures NO 
H4 Experience  Freq. Preventative Measures NO 
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H5 Experience  Regular Offline Backups NO 
H6 Risk/Exp. Interaction  Network Act Mon NO 
H7 Risk/Exp. Interaction  Physical Control NO 
H8 Risk/Exp. Interaction  Prev. Software NO 
H9 Risk/Exp. Interaction  Freq. Prev. Meas. NO 
H10 Risk/Exp. Interaction  Reg. Offline Back. NO 
H11 Risk  Network Activity Monitoring NO 
H12 Risk  Physical Control NO 
H13 Risk  Prev. Software Measures NO 
H14 Risk  Freq. Preventative Measures NO 
H15 Risk  Regular Offline Backups NO 
H16 Network Act. Mon.  Readiness to Detect YES 
H17 Physical Control  Readiness to Prevent NO 
H18 Prev. Soft. Mea.  Readiness to Prevent NO 
H19 Freq. Prev. Meas.  Readiness to Prevent NO 
H20 Reg. Offline Back  Readiness to Recover YES 
H21 Awar. Immed. Thrt  Readiness to Detect YES 
H22 Awar. Immed. Thrt  Readiness to Prevent NO 
H23 Awar. Vulnerabilities  Readiness to Prev. YES 
H24 Awar. Defensive Mea.  Readiness to Prv. YES 
H25 Usr. Comm. Aware.  Readiness to Detect YES 
H26 Usr. Comm. Aware.  Readiness to Prevnt. YES 
   
As can be seen in Table 24, when the interaction of risk avoidance and level of previous 
experience with cybersecurity is included in the model, only 7 of the 26 hypothesized 
relationships ended up being significant at some level at or below the .05 threshold.  However, as 
can be seen in Figure 14, when the risk factor and the associated interaction term are removed 
from the model, as supported by its relatively low average variance explained value from Table 
17 as well as by the fact that it does not significantly contribute the model, an IT manager’s level 
of previous experience with cybersecurity comes back into play.  The beta and p values for the 
first five hypotheses, when risk is not included in the model, are listed below in Table 25. 
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Table 25: PACRM Path Model Results for H1‐H5 when Risk and the Interaction Term are Removed 
Hypothesis 
# 
Regression Path Param. 
Value 
S.E. Critical 
Value 
P 
H1 Experience  Network Activity Monitoring .634 .105 6.042 <.001 
H2 Experience  Physical Control .531 .112 4.749 <.001 
H3 Experience  Prev. Software Measures .142 .079 1.792 .073 
H4 Experience  Freq. Preventative Measures .520 .112 4.629 <.001 
H5 Experience  Regular Offline Backups .490 .125 3.918 <.001 
 
There is, therefore, evidence to suggest relationships between an IT manager’s level of 
previous cybersecurity experience and the extent of his or her use of network activity monitoring 
behaviors (H1, p < .001), the degree to which he or she exercises physical control over computer 
resources (H2, p < .001), the frequency with which he or she updates preventative measures such 
as passwords, firewalls, or anti-malware software (H4, p <.001), and the periodic use of regular 
offline backups (H5, p < .001).  While the IT manager’s level of previous experience does seem 
to influence the frequency with which he or she updates preventative measures such as adjusting 
the settings on firewalls, anti-virus, or anti-malware software, it does not seem to affect the 
extent to which he or she uses these preventative software measures (H3, p =.073).  This 
suggests that either the use of preventative software measures is ubiquitous across most of the IT 
managers surveyed, regardless of level of experience, or that the use of preventative software 
measures occurs only on a limited number of computer and network resources, but that the more 
experienced IT managers keep those settings updated on a regular basis. 
The use of network activity monitoring devices and the frequency with which IT managers 
examine logs looking for signs of suspicious activity did prove to be a strong determinant of their 
perceived readiness to detect cyberattacks (H16, p < .001).  This is an important consideration.  
One significant area of concern in organizational cybersecurity is in creating opportunities for IT 
administrators to regularly go through their network activity logs looking for signs of suspicious 
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network activity.  Most administrators are far too busy or disinterested to regularly peruse 
network log data.  As this research demonstrates, however, the dividends in terms of an increased 
perception of readiness to detect a cyberattack are clear.  Similarly, the periodic use of offline 
backups was a clear determinant in administrators’ perceived readiness to recover from a 
cyberattack (H20, p < .001). 
The IT manager’s perceived awareness of the immediate threat environment, which was 
operationalized as his or her knowledge and awareness of the type of network traffic that is 
flowing through the organizational unit’s computer networks and any intersecting computer 
networks, was also a strong indicator of his or her perceived readiness to detect a cyberattack 
(H21, p < .001).  However, the assurances provided by such knowledge did not extend to an 
increased perceptual readiness to prevent a cyberattack (H22, p = .835).  This suggests that 
detection and prevention of cyberattacks are indeed two very distinct subsets of cybersecurity 
and network administrative skills and that while some IT administrators may feel well versed in 
the detection of suspicious activity, they do not necessarily feel as though they can prevent 
cyberattacks.  It is important to be realistic, therefore, about the fact that, considering zero-day 
exploits and other non-detectable threats, prevention of cyberattacks is a very different animal 
than is detection. 
Awareness of vulnerabilities in the physical infrastructure and awareness of defensive 
measures were statistically significant determinants of a perceived readiness to prevent a 
cyberattack (H23 & H24, p < .05).  Recall from the discussion on discriminant validity earlier in 
this chapter that these two factors were highly correlated with one another.  It may be that some 
second-order latent factor such as preparedness is driving the responses on the survey items.  
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Therefore, it is not entirely surprising that these variables would act upon perceived readiness to 
prevent a cyberattack in a similar manner.   
What is particularly interesting about this research is the apparent effect that the degree to 
which the user community is educated on IT security issues affects the administrator’s perceived 
readiness to detect (H25, p < .01) and prevent (H26, p < .001) cyberattacks.  This is a hallmark 
of complex, multi-tiered, decentralized organizations.  Since workgroup IT managers who work 
at the organizational-unit level of such institutions are often doing so in support of a small user 
community, this research highlights the importance of training programs to educate those users 
on adhering to safe computer behaviors in the workplace.  Such behaviors may include not using 
USB drives in personal and work computers or being wary of situations in which phishing or 
social engineering attempts are likely to occur. 
One way to conceptualize the scope of this finding is that smaller organizations, such as 
entrepreneurships operate in very similar ways as do individual departments within larger 
organizations do.  A start-up business might, for example, have only one or two IT 
administrators who struggle with safeguarding the computer resources of the business while 
managing excessive demands on their time and resources.  Often that person may not even have 
a background in IT management.  By highlighting the apparent effectiveness of educating the 
user community on issues related to IT security, this research supports a way to increase the 
cybersecurity profile for such organizations.  It should be clear, in fact, from the recent, high 
profile cyber and ransom ware attacks that have taken place that cybersecurity is an issue that 
affects everyone.  To be sure, many behaviors, such as using network activity logging 
mechanisms like Intrusion Detection and Prevention Systems and sensors, as well as regularly 
monitoring the log data from those devices, rest squarely on the shoulders of the IT 
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administrator.  Similarly, the periodic use of offline backups of important organizational unit 
data is a task that is best suited for the individual IT administrator.  However, gone are the 
halcyon days where employees, executives, students, educators, and administrators could breathe 
an inward sigh of relief every time they read about a cyberattack and think to themselves, “I’m 
glad that I don’t have to deal with that.”  As this research plausibly demonstrates, the behavior of 
the user community on issues related to IT security can positively or adversely affect IT 
administrators’ level of comfort in their ability to detect and prevent cyberattacks.  This is an 
especially important consideration in decentralized institutions such as colleges and universities 
where the local workgroup IT manager may be the sole individual responsible for securing the 
organizational unit’s data resources. 
Finally, the results from the path analysis show that only one of the direct effects between 
the IT administrator’s level of previous cybersecurity experience and the three response variables 
was significant.  The relationship between the IT administrator’s previous cybersecurity 
experience and his or her perceived readiness to recover from a cyberattack was significant (p < 
.001).  Similarly, previous experience in cybersecurity was a strong determinant of an IT 
administrator’s extent of use of regular, offline backups (H5, p < .001), which in turn was a 
strong determinant of his or her perceived readiness to recover from a cyberattack (H20, p < 
.001).  The fact that the direct effect was significant suggests that the relationship between an IT 
administrator’s level of previous experience with cybersecurity and his or her perceived level of 
readiness to recover from a cyberattack is only partially mediated by the extent of his or her use 
of regular, offline backups.   
In this case, the IT administrator’s level of experience may be driving his or her perceived 
readiness to recover from a cyberattack, above the effect provided by the extent of his or her use 
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of regular, offline backups.  This is not unreasonable since the measures related to the IT 
manager’s behavior regarding backing up critical data were explicitly directed towards those 
behaviors that involved offline backups.  However, IT administrators routinely keep numerous 
backups of critical data and only a very few (or one) of them may be kept offline.  These 
additional backups would then, reasonably, be a determinant in the administrator’s perceived 
readiness to recover from a cyberattack. 
There was, however, a lack of a statistically significant direct effect between the IT 
manager’s level of previous cybersecurity experience and his or her perceived readiness to detect 
a cyberattack, even though both indirect effects were significant (H1 & H16, p < .001).  
According to Barron & Kenny (1986), this indicates that the extent of an IT administrator’s use 
of network activity monitoring devices fully mediates the relationship between his or her level of 
previous experience with cybersecurity and his or her perceived readiness to detect a cyberattack. 
It is not unreasonable to conclude that the relationship between the IT administrator’s level 
of previous experience with cybersecurity and his or her perceived readiness to detect a 
cyberattack is fully mediated by his or her use of network activity monitoring devices.  As was 
commented upon in the literature review of this dissertation, detection of extant cybersecurity 
threats remains one of the most challenging aspects of cybersecurity to this day.  The use of 
network activity monitoring devices such as traffic analyzers and sensor deployments greatly aid 
in the discovery process.  One would not expect to see a high level of perceived readiness to 
detect cyberattacks, at any level in the organization, without the routine use of such devices. 
5.5 Concluding Remarks 
This research was originally undertaken to shine a light, however dim, on the darkened 
corner of information security research that is the higher education sector.  Vast numbers of 
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workgroup IT managers at colleges and universities across the United States are responsible for 
safeguarding large territories of sensitive computer and data resources.   Student admissions data 
or staff and faculty health data are examples that readily spring to mind.  However, the work of 
such administrators, particularly with respect to cybersecurity, often seems to go unnoticed.   
Since such administrators may or may not report directly to the centralized IT department, their 
cybersecurity preparedness may all too often be overlooked when looking at the cybersecurity 
profile of the organization.  To make matters worse, only a very small slice of the information 
security research that has taken place in recent years has looked at the higher education sector.  It 
is heartening to note that, in the year and a half that this research has taken, more studies relating 
to information security in higher education have begun to emerge (Kobezak et al., 2018; Khouja 
et al., 2018).  This is a good thing.   
Since institutions of higher learning are among the most decentralized and open institutions 
in our society, understanding how information security can be improved upon in these settings 
informs us all.  How should organizational cybersecurity look when there is little opportunity for 
rigid controls and punitive deterrents to enforce proper behaviors?  In all decentralized 
organizations, of which colleges and universities are merely one example, it is imperative that we 
empower the human resources in the individual departments to engage in workplace behaviors, 
which this and other research studies have affirmed aid in the ability of workgroup IT managers 
to detect, prevent, and, if necessary, recover from a cyberattack. 
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6 DISCUSSION & CONCLUSION 
 
6.1 Summary of Results 
To summarize, this study examined the effects that factors related to workgroup IT 
managers’ level of previous experience with cybersecurity, their attitudes towards risk 
avoidance, the extent of their use of networking and cybersecurity best practices, their awareness 
of several aspects of their computing and network environments, and the extent to which their 
user communities were educated about topics related to IT security, have on their perceived 
readiness to detect, prevent, and recover from a cyberattack.  A new instrument, the Practice and 
Awareness Cybersecurity Readiness Model (PACRM) survey, was proposed and validated.  As 
part of the instrument validation process, three distinct stages of research were conducted.  
Stages 1 and 2 comprised the pilot test or pre-test phase while stage 3 made up the roll-out phase.  
Stage 1 consisted of qualitative interviews with a handful of IT administrators working at the 
decentralized, department level of a large, public university in the southeastern United States.  It 
also consisted of a “think-aloud” protocol while the administrators took a paper-based version of 
the initial PACRM survey.  Stage 2 consisted of a pilot test whereby the PACRM survey was 
administered to several IT administrators at colleges and universities throughout the southeastern 
United States.  Taken together, stages 1 and 2 helped to establish of the content validity of the 
PACRM instrument.
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Stage 3 consisted of a national survey of 161 IT administrators working at colleges and 
universities throughout the United States.  Reliability statistics showed good reliability for all 
thirteen of the proposed factors.  Additionally, a Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) on the 
refined PACRM measurement model showed a fair model fit. Lastly, a path analysis, which used 
participants’ averaged scores on the measurement variables to represent each factor, showed that 
11 of the 21 hypotheses were supported (See Tables 23 & 24). 
6.2 The Motivation for the Project 
As alluded to above, this project was initially undertaken to combat the relative paucity of 
information security research, which relates to the higher education sector.  Since the principal 
researcher spent a time as a workgroup IT manager at several institutions of higher learning 
throughout the United States, this research was also undoubtedly a catharsis.  Above all, it was a 
way to answer the question that had been bouncing around the researcher’s mind for years, what 
are administrators in colleges and universities doing in terms of cybersecurity?  It was a question 
that needed to be answered.  Over the course of the year and a half that it took to take this project 
from conception to fruition, however, it has grown into something more.  Through speaking and 
emailing with IT administrators across the country, hearing their frustrations, witnessing their 
overwhelming generosity in overcoming their initial suspicions to help a PhD student complete 
his research, a profound appreciation for the work that they do emerged.  Although this country 
has recently been besieged by incident after incident, the evidence is suggestive that the most 
efficient solution, indeed the only cost-effective solution for IT administration at the 
decentralized level, is in raising the self-efficacy expectations of the human IT managers at 
organizations across the country.  As any good MIS textbook will tell you, after all, the most 
important component of any information system is the person. 
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6.3 Genesis of the Conceptual Model 
The primary genesis for the Practice and Awareness Cybersecurity Readiness Model came 
from the researcher’s own experiences as a workgroup IT manager at several decentralized 
institutions of higher learning across the United States.  During such work, it was often 
frustrating to realize that so much more than was being done in terms of cybersecurity could be 
done with only a little more time or a little more budget.   
The first step in developing the model came with the awareness that the response variables 
in many information security studies often have very little to say about the direct, daily actions of 
the actual IT administrator.  The first challenge, therefore, in developing the model, lay in the 
problem of how to conceive of IT security in a way which relates to the day-to-day actions of the 
IT administrator, whether he or she be at the centralized or decentralized level of IT 
administration.  What does information security look like on the ground, as it were?  The clearest 
answer to that question was found in the numerous and excellent standards and frameworks for 
good IT management, which have been published over the years by regulatory and government 
entities.  The NIST 2014 high-level functions listed in Table 2 of this dissertation were 
particularly helpful in deciding on the response variables of choice depicted in Figures 1 and 6. 
Secondly, the independent variables had to be chosen.  It was apparent early in the 
conceptual design process that the model would focus on the daily practices of IT administrators 
as well as on more general aspects of “awareness” of the computing and networking environment 
in and around the organizational unit.  The specific constructs that would comprise these 
amorphous groups had yet to be decided upon, however.  Again, the international and national 
standards, which the United States federal government and others use to safeguard their data 
resources, were immensely helpful.  However, also informative in this regard were the 
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numerous, high-quality research studies from the Management Information Systems and 
Computer Information Systems disciplines.  The innumerable research studies on incidents of 
computer abuse (only a few of which made their way into this dissertation) from the early 
nineties from Detmar Straub and others, which are based in General Deterrence Theory, were 
particularly determinative in illuminating one of the many paths that information security 
research has taken over the past thirty years.  Equally as rewarding, however, were the studies 
that look at information security from the vantage point of the Theory of Planned Behavior.  
This, of course, led to a realization that what the model had been trying to get at, all along, was 
how to define and increase the self-efficacy of workgroup IT managers in terms of cybersecurity.  
The fact that the perceived readiness of IT managers to detect, prevent, and recover from a 
cyberattack dovetailed so nicely with Bandura’s original conception of efficacy expectations is 
what cemented the PACRM model’s place within the Self-Efficacy Theory camp of information 
security research. 
Lastly, the role of the IT administrator’s level of previous experience with cybersecurity, as 
well as the role that his or her attitude towards risk played in the model had to be conceptualized.  
From experience and from the literature, it was decided that the IT manager’s level of previous 
experience indelibly shaped the extent of his or her use of cybersecurity best practices, which by 
this point had crystallized around the use of network activity monitoring devices, control over 
physical access to computer resources, the use of preventative software measures, and the use of 
offline backups.  It was the McHugh et al. article (2000) that led to the conceptualization that the 
level of previous experience with cybersecurity construct had to entail the dual perspectives of 
both cyberattack and cyber defense.  Fred Kaplan’s excellent book entitled, “Dark Territory:  
The Secret History of Cyber War,” illustrates that the NSA conceptualizes cybersecurity in a 
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similar way, as comprising elements of both CNA (Computer Network Attack) and CND 
(Computer Network Defense), as well as the more nebulous third element of CNE (Computer 
Network Exploitation).  Meanwhile, it seemed natural that an IT manager’s attitude towards risk 
would moderate the relationship between his or her level of previous experience with 
cybersecurity and the extent of his or her use of networking and cybersecurity best practices. 
The group of “awareness” factors came together much more slowly.  It was known from the 
beginning of the model development process that these three factors should comprise elements 
that were of daily concern to IT administrators.  As such, the first factor, Awareness of the 
Immediate Threat Environment, seemed fairly straightforward.  The numerous articles that 
stressed the importance of placing network sensors on both sides of the network periphery as part 
of a “Defense in Depth” strategy seemed to confirm this viewpoint.  As stated previously, a full 
strategy, requiring dozens of strategically placed sensor and traffic analyzers on both sides of the 
network border, would seem to be beyond the scope of many decentralized organizational units.  
However, a knowledgeable IT administrator, who knows the behaviors and habits of his or her 
user community and who frequently examines the data from a single IDS/IPS, will have an 
above average idea of what type of network traffic is flowing across the network without 
resorting to an expensive, laborious array of sensors. 
Once the outward-looking construct was thus conceived, it seemed prudent to look inward at 
the physical infrastructure of the computer network and any vulnerabilities that may exist 
therein.  Once vulnerabilities or other potential areas of weakness were identified, defensive 
measures could be deployed.  Hence, the second and third awareness constructs were born.  It 
was thought that by looking outward, towards the threats that IT administrators might face, they 
would feel that much more ready to detect potential cyberattacks.  By looking inward, however, 
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at how the network was laid out and at any potential vulnerabilities as well as the defensive 
measures that were in place to safeguard the network, IT administrators might show a greater 
readiness to prevent said attacks. 
Lastly, the Degree to Which the User Community is Aware of Issues Related to IT Security 
came about, as mentioned, through the qualitative interview process.  It’s primacy in affecting 
both IT administrators’ perceived readiness to detect and prevent cyberattacks speaks to the 
efficacy and necessity of the instrument validation process. 
6.4 Conclusions about the Conceptual Model 
This research, which represents the first iteration of empirical testing for the PACRM model, 
showed that the model performed reasonably well despite several aspects of the research that can 
be greatly improved upon in future attempts.  First, as the initial PACRM measurement model in 
Table 5 of this dissertation shows, the survey that was used to test the underlying theoretical 
assumptions was not particularly well designed.  Some constructs had twelve associated 
measurement variables while others had only two.  This poor design ultimately proved somewhat 
serendipitous by making it clear through the CFA process that the frequency with which the 
settings on software preventative measures such as firewalls, antivirus, and anti-malware 
software are updated does not equate with the extent of use of such software.  A plausible 
explanation for this seeming discrepancy is that workgroup IT managers deploy such software on 
only a limited set of computer resources (presumably those that hold sensitive data) but that they 
update the settings on such software regularly.  Furthermore, many of the measurements from the 
initial survey were not used in the final measurement model due to low factor loadings.  The 
refined PACRM measurement model is, therefore, far more parsimonious than was the initial 
attempt.  Nonetheless, a more well-designed survey should be developed.  Doing so should 
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greatly improve how the model performs, both in terms of overall model fit and in terms of the 
discriminant validity of the proposed constructs.   
Furthermore, it was evident from this analysis that the Awareness of Vulnerabilities in the 
Physical Infrastructure and Awareness of Defensive Measures were very closely correlated in the 
minds of the study’s participants.  Again, this might be an instance where cleaning up the 
measurement instrument used to test the model could be of enormous benefit. 
6.5 Implications for Researchers 
Taken as a whole, the Practice and Awareness Cybersecurity Readiness Model represents a 
theoretical basis upon which the gauge (and hopefully raise) the self-efficacy expectations of 
Workgroup IT managers with respect to their cyber security readiness.  It provides a unified set 
of constructs that are grounded in the day-to-day practices of IT managers as well as in their 
awareness of the computing and networking environments that they oversee.  Researchers will 
able to test how those daily practices and levels of awareness interact within different settings 
and under different conditions.  Many of the constructs in the model are fairly specific.  
Researchers should therefore welcome the opportunity to pull the constituent parts of the model 
apart to test under what conditions they hold true.  Even though the testing of this model took 
place within a specific context of IT administration, namely at the decentralized level of IT 
administration at colleges and universities, it should be equally as applicable to other levels of IT 
administration across a variety of organizational contexts. 
Lastly, the enumeration of the three response variables in the PACRM model should 
hopefully help to guide future information security research towards projects in which the 
answers to the questions being asked are rooted in the day-to-day concerns of IT practitioners. 
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6.6 Limitations for Conceptual Model Validity 
The model was developed using a specific, implicit set of cultural assumptions that are 
based in the principal researcher’s many years of personal experience as a workgroup IT 
manager working at the decentralized level of IT administration within the United States.  It was 
also well grounded in national and international frameworks as well as in a rich corpus of 
Management Information Systems and Computer Information Systems literature.  Nonetheless, 
there is no reason to believe that the assumptions, which are intrinsic to the model, will hold true 
across every conceivable cultural or situational context.  The model may perform very differently 
in other settings where, for instance, cyber defense takes on different priorities and meanings.  It 
cannot immediately be assumed, for example, that the the values of authenticity, confidentiality, 
and availability, upon which the three response variables are predicated, will always have the 
same meaning. 
6.7 Directions for Future Research 
The most immediate direction for future research for the PACRM model is to test the 
theoretical assumptions across a variety of organizational settings, to see how specifically the 
relationships hold up under decentralized and centralized levels of IT administration.  Since the 
initial empirical testing took place within the higher education sector, it would seem prudent to 
test the model in other business and organizational settings including regional offices of multi-
national firms and national firms, entrepreneurships, non-profits, healthcare, and other 
governmental agencies.  In addition, expanding the model in terms of some of the assumptions 
inherent in the User Community Awareness factor, such as social engineering awareness, would 
provide a useful contribution to the literature.  Finally, it seems prudent to determine under 
which conditions self-efficacy-based models, such as the PACRM model, perform better or 
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worse against solutions that are based on other theoretical orientations, such as General 
Deterrence Theory.
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7 APPENDIX A – PACRM QUALITATIVE INTERVIEW QUESTIONS – STAGE 1 
 
 
1. As an Information Technology (IT) manager working at a college or university campus, which 
computer and network security best practices do you consider to be the most important for an IT 
manager in a similar setting as yours to implement in order to maximize his or her cybersecurity 
readiness? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.  What aspects of network security do you consider to be the most important for an IT manager in a 
similar setting as yours to be aware of in order to maximize his or her cybersecurity readiness? 
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3. How would you rank the relative importance of an IT manager’s previous level of experience with 
cybersecurity training in determining his or her cybersecurity readiness? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4. How would you rank the relative importance of the number and type of an IT manager’s 
cybersecurity‐related certifications in determining his or her cybersecurity readiness? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5. How would you rank the relative importance of an IT manager’s attitudes towards risk, both in 
general terms and in terms of information security, in affecting his or her perceptions of 
cybersecurity readiness? 
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6. Please take a few minutes to look over and take the PACRM survey, which follows.  Please verbalize 
your thoughts regarding the format, structure, ease, and applicability of the survey questions as you 
complete the questionnaire.  Note that we will not discuss your comments or interact while you are 
completing the survey; however, we will discuss these afterwards to help improve the 
questionnaire. 
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8 APPENDIX B – INITIAL PACRM SURVEY INSTRUMENT – STAGE 2 
 
Start of Block: Demographic Block 
D.1 How old are you? 
 19 years or below  (1)  
 20 - 24 years  (2)  
 25 - 29 years  (3)  
 30 - 34 years  (4)  
 35 - 39 years  (5)  
 40 - 44 years  (6)  
 45 - 49 years  (7)  
 50 - 54 years  (8)  
 55 - 59 years  (9)  
 60 - 64 years  (10)  
 65 - 69 years  (11)  
 70 years or above  (12)  
 
 
D.2 Are you male or female?  
 Male  (1)  
 Female  (2)  
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D.3 Years of Experience 
 0-4 (1) 
5-9 
(2) 
10-14 
(3) 
15-19 
(4) 
20-24 
(5) 
25-29 
(6) 
30-34 
(7) 
35-39 
(8) 
40 or 
above 
(9) 
How many 
years of 
experience 
do you have 
in the 
Information 
Technology 
(IT) field? 
(1)  
                  
How many 
years of 
experience 
do you have 
working in 
IT positions 
at colleges 
and 
universities? 
(2)  
                  
 
 
D.4 What state is your current school physically located in? 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
D.5 What is your current job title? 
________________________________________________________________ 
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D.6 Is your direct supervisor a member of the institution's central Information Technology (IT) 
department or of an academic unit? 
 Central IT Department  (1)  
 Academic Unit  (2)  
 
 
D.7 Does your work primarily support faculty and staff (Academic Unit) or non-academic 
support staff such as the institution's human resources department, physical plant department, 
central administration, etc. (Support Unit). 
 
 Academic Unit  (1)  
 Support Unit  (2)  
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D.8 Please 
indicate your 
level of 
agreement to 
each of the 
following 
statements: 
Strongly 
agree (1) 
Somewhat 
agree (2) 
Neither agree 
nor disagree 
(3) 
Somewhat 
disagree (4) 
Strongly 
disagree (5) 
In general, I 
try to avoid 
risk 
whenever 
possible. (1)  
          
I am more 
comfortable 
accepting risk 
in personal 
matters than I 
am in matters 
pertaining to 
my work. (2)  
          
I am not 
comfortable 
accepting risk 
when it 
comes to the 
information 
security of 
my school or 
department. 
(3)  
          
End of Block: Demographic Block  
Start of Block: Prior Experience Block 
PE.1 Please list any cybersecurity related certifications that you currently hold?  If you do not 
have any such certifications, please mark 0 below.  Common cybersecurity certifications may 
include Certified Information Security Auditor (CISA), Certified Information Security Manager 
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(CISM), Certified Information Systems Security Professional (CISSP), Certified Ethical Hacker 
(CEH), etc.   
________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
PE.2 Please list any other IT or professional certifications that you currently hold?   
________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
PE.3 How many hours have you spent taking part in cybersecurity training? (Either as part of 
formalized training programs or as part of certification preparation) 
 0 - 10 hours  (1)  
 10 - 50 hours  (2)  
 50 - 200 hours  (3)  
 200+ hours  (4)  
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PE.4 Please indicate your level of previous experience with each of the following: 
 Extensive (1) A lot (2) A moderate amount (3) A little (4) 
None at all 
(5) 
Preventing or 
stopping 
cyberattacks? 
(1)  
          
Initiating 
cyberattacks? 
(Either as part 
of an 
advanced 
cybersecurity 
certification 
training 
program, or 
as a Certified 
Ethical 
Hacker, or on 
your own) (2)  
          
End of Block: Prior Experience Block  
Start of Block: Extent of Use Block 
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EU.1 Please 
indicate the 
extent to 
which you 
use each of 
the following 
in your unit: 
Extensively 
(1) A lot (2) 
A moderate 
amount (3) A little (4) 
None at all 
(5) 
Network 
activity 
logging 
mechanisms 
to monitor 
network 
activity? (1)  
          
Intrusion 
Detection 
Systems 
(IDS) and/or 
Intrusion 
Prevention 
Systems 
(IPS) on your 
network? (2)  
          
A sensor 
deployment 
and/or traffic 
analyzer for 
your 
network? (3)  
          
Controlling 
unauthorized 
physical 
access to 
network and 
server 
resources? (4)  
          
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Servers or 
other vital 
computer 
resources are 
secured in a 
locked room 
and/or server 
cabinet? (5)  
          
Computers 
that have the 
BIOS  
locked, or for 
which it is 
otherwise 
impossible to 
boot from an 
external 
device? (6)  
          
Computers 
with 
encrypted 
hard drives? 
(7)  
          
Servers or 
other vital 
computer 
resources 
with 
encrypted 
hard drives? 
(8)  
          
Requiring 
strong 
passwords to 
prevent 
unauthorized 
use? (9)  
          
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Computers 
that are 
protected 
with antivirus 
software? 
(10)  
          
Computers 
that are 
protected 
with anti-
malware 
software? 
(11)  
          
Computers 
that are 
protected by 
one or more 
firewalls? 
(12)  
          
Regular 
backups of 
servers or 
other vital 
computer 
resources that 
are then kept 
offline? (13)  
          
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EU.2 Please 
indicate the 
frequency for 
which each of 
following is 
true for the 
equipment in 
your unit: 
Very 
frequently (1) 
Frequently 
(2) 
Periodically 
(3) Seldom (4) Never (5) 
You monitor 
general 
network 
activity logs 
for signs of 
suspicious 
network 
activity? (1)  
          
You check 
the probing 
and/or block 
reports from 
any Intrusion 
Detection 
Systems 
(IDS) and/or 
Intrusion 
Prevention 
Systems 
(IPS) on your 
network? (2)  
          
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You analyze 
reports or 
data from a 
sensor 
deployment 
(e.g., 
honeypots, 
traffic 
analyzers 
other than 
your IDS/IPS, 
etc.) for your 
network? (3)  
          
Unauthorized 
visitors have 
access to 
server and 
network 
resources? (4)  
          
You require 
authorized 
users to 
change their 
passwords? 
(5)  
          
You update 
antivirus 
definitions 
for the 
computers in 
your school 
or 
department? 
(6)  
          
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You update 
the anti-
malware 
settings to 
reflect current 
or emerging 
threats? (7)  
          
You update 
the firewall 
settings to 
reflect current 
or emerging 
threats? (8)  
          
You update 
the firewall 
setting to 
allow 
approved 
applications 
to access the 
network? (9)  
          
You run 
critical 
software and 
operating 
system 
updates on 
computers? 
(10)  
          
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You back up 
servers or 
vital 
computer 
resources 
according to a 
backup policy 
that requires 
offline 
storage of 
backups? (11)  
          
End of Block: Extent of Use Block  
Start of Block: Education Block 
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ED.1 Please 
indicate the 
extent to 
which you 
feel that the 
user 
community 
you support is 
educated 
about the 
following 
topics related 
to 
information 
security: 
Extensively 
(1) A lot (2) 
A moderate 
amount (3) A little (4) 
None at all 
(5) 
The need to 
update their 
work 
computer's 
operating 
system and/or 
applications 
whenever a 
new update 
becomes 
available? (1)  
          
The need to 
update their 
antivirus 
definitions 
whenever a 
new update 
becomes 
available? (2)  
          
 139 
The need to 
exercise 
caution when 
using USB 
drives or 
external hard 
drives, which 
they have 
previously 
used outside 
the 
workplace, on 
a school or 
department 
computer? (3)  
          
The need to 
exercise 
caution when 
downloading 
or installing 
software or 
apps from 
untrusted 
sources onto 
their work 
computers? 
(4)  
          
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The need to 
exercise 
caution when 
engaging in 
conversations 
that could 
divulge 
sensitive 
information 
to 
unauthorized 
personnel, 
such as is 
common in 
social-
engineering 
type 
situations? 
(5)  
          
The need to 
exercise 
caution when 
opening 
email 
attachments 
and clickable 
links in 
email? (6)  
          
End of Block: Education Block  
Start of Block: Perceived Awareness Block 
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PA.1 How 
do you rate 
your level 
of 
knowledge 
for each of 
the 
following 
for the 
equipment 
in your 
school or 
department: 
Extremely 
knowledgeabl
e (1) 
Somewhat 
knowledgeabl
e (2) 
Moderately 
knowledgeabl
e (3) 
Somewhat 
not 
knowledgeabl
e (4) 
Not 
knowledgeabl
e at all (5) 
The volume 
and type of 
network 
traffic that 
takes place 
on your 
network? 
(1)  
          
The 
integrity of 
network 
traffic on 
any 
networks 
that 
intersect 
with yours? 
(2)  
          
 142 
The 
infection 
rate of the 
computers 
you support 
in terms of 
viruses 
and/or 
malware is 
zero? (3)  
          
The 
vulnerabilit
y of your 
computers 
and network 
equipment 
to a 
cyberattack
? (4)  
          
The 
physical 
infrastructur
e of your 
network? 
(5)  
          
The type of 
defensive 
measures 
that are 
currently 
protecting 
your 
network? 
(6)  
          
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PA.2 How do 
you rate your 
level of 
comfort for 
each of the 
following for 
the equipment 
in your unit: 
Extremely 
comfortable 
(1) 
Somewhat 
comfortable 
(2) 
Neither 
comfortable 
nor 
uncomfortable 
(3) 
Somewhat 
uncomfortable 
(4) 
Extremely 
uncomfortable 
(5) 
None of your 
computers or 
network 
resources are 
being used to 
support 
illegal 
activities? (1)  
          
The network 
traffic on any 
networks that 
intersect with 
your network 
is clean and 
secure? (2)  
          
The number 
and severity 
of potential 
vulnerabilities 
on your 
network are 
minimal? (3)  
          
The physical 
infrastructure 
of your 
network is 
secure from 
being 
hacked? (4)  
          
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The defensive 
measures that 
are currently 
protecting 
your network 
are sufficient 
to keep your 
system 
protected 
from a 
cyberattack? 
(5)  
          
End of Block: Perceived Awareness Block  
Start of Block: Perceived Readiness Block 
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PR.1 How do 
you rate your 
ability in 
relation to 
each of the 
following for 
the 
equipment in 
your school 
or 
department: 
Extremely 
able (1) 
Somewhat 
able (2) 
Moderately 
able (3) 
Somewhat 
not able (4) 
Not able at 
all (5) 
To detect 
whether a 
computer or 
network 
resource has 
been 
compromised 
by malware? 
(1)  
          
To detect 
whether a 
computer or 
network 
resource is 
being used in 
support of an 
illegal 
activity such 
as a 
Distributed 
Denial of 
Service 
(DDoS) 
attack? (2)  
          
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To prevent a 
cyberattack 
from stealing 
sensitive 
information 
from any 
computer or 
network 
resource? (3)  
          
To prevent a 
ransom ware 
attack from 
encrypting 
servers or 
sensitive data 
resources? (4)  
          
To recover 
users’ access 
to vital 
computer 
resources in 
the event of a 
ransom ware 
attack, 
without 
paying the 
ransom? (5)  
          
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PR.2 How do 
you rate your 
readiness to 
address each 
of the 
following for 
the 
equipment in 
your school 
or 
department: 
Extremely 
ready (1) 
Somewhat 
ready (2) 
Neither ready 
nor not ready 
(3) 
Somewhat 
not ready (4) 
Not ready at 
all (5) 
To detect 
whether a 
computer or 
network 
resource has 
been hacked? 
(1)  
          
To prevent a 
ransom ware 
attack from 
limiting 
users’ ability 
to access data 
resources? 
(2)  
          
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To prevent a 
ransom ware 
attack from 
encrypting 
servers or 
sensitive data 
resources 
such as data 
that falls 
under 
FERPA or 
HIPAA 
regulations? 
(3)  
          
To recover 
data 
resources 
after they 
have been 
fully or 
partially 
erased by a 
computer 
virus? (4)  
          
To recover 
data 
resources 
after they 
have been 
encrypted by 
a ransom 
ware? (5)  
          
End of Block: Perceived Readiness Block  
149 
9 APPENDIX C – REVISED PACRM SURVEY INSTRUMENT – STAGE 3 
  
Start of Block: Demographic Block 
D.1 How old are you? 
 19 years or below  (1)  
 20 - 24 years  (2)  
 25 - 29 years  (3)  
 30 - 34 years  (4)  
 35 - 39 years  (5)  
 40 - 44 years  (6)  
 45 - 49 years  (7)  
 50 - 54 years  (8)  
 55 - 59 years  (9)  
 60 - 64 years  (10)  
 65 - 69 years  (11)  
 70 years or above  (12)  
 
 
 
D.2 Are you male or female?  
 Male  (1)  
 Female  (2)  
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D.3 Years of Experience 
 0-4 (1) 
5-9 
(2) 
10-14 
(3) 
15-19 
(4) 
20-24 
(5) 
25-29 
(6) 
30-34 
(7) 
35-39 
(8) 
40 or 
above 
(9) 
How many 
years of 
experience 
do you have 
in the 
Information 
Technology 
(IT) field? 
(1)  
                  
How many 
years of 
experience 
do you have 
working in 
IT positions 
at colleges 
and 
universities? 
(2)  
                  
 
 
 
D.4 What state is your current organization physically located in? 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
D.5 What is your current job title? 
________________________________________________________________ 
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D.6 Is your direct supervisor a member of the institution's central Information Technology (IT) 
department or of an academic unit? 
 Central IT Department  (1)  
 Academic Unit  (2)  
 
 
 
D.7 Does your work primarily support faculty and staff (Academic Unit) or non-academic 
support staff such as the institution's human resources department, physical plant department, 
central administration, etc. (Support Unit). 
 
 Academic Unit  (1)  
 Support Unit  (2)  
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D.8 Indicate 
your level of 
agreement to 
each of the 
following 
items: 
Strongly 
agree (1) 
Somewhat 
agree (2) 
Neither agree 
nor disagree 
(3) 
Somewhat 
disagree (4) 
Strongly 
disagree (5) 
In general, I 
try to avoid 
risk 
whenever 
possible at 
work. (1)  
          
I am not 
comfortable 
accepting risk 
in matters 
related to my 
job. (2)  
          
I am not 
comfortable 
accepting risk 
when it 
comes to the 
information 
security of 
my 
department. 
(3)  
          
End of Block: Demographic Block  
Start of Block: Prior Experience Block 
 
PE.1 Please list any cybersecurity related certifications that you currently hold?  If you do not 
have any such certifications, please mark 0 below.  Common  cybersecurity certifications may 
include Certified Information Security Auditor (CISA), Certified Information  Security Manager 
(CISM), Certified Information Systems Security Professional (CISSP), Certified Ethical  Hacker 
(CEH), etc.   
________________________________________________________________ 
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________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
PE.2 Please list any other IT or professional certifications that you currently hold?   
________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
PE.3 How many hours have you spent taking part in cybersecurity training? (Either as part of 
formalized training programs or as part of certification preparation) 
 0 - 10 hours  (1)  
 10 - 50 hours  (2)  
 50 - 200 hours  (3)  
 200+ hours  (4)  
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PE.4 Indicate 
your level of 
previous 
experience 
with each of 
the following 
items: 
Extensive (1) A lot (2) A moderate amount (3) A little (4) 
None at all 
(5) 
Preventing or 
stopping 
cyberattacks? 
(1)  
          
Initiating 
cyberattacks? 
(Either as part 
of an 
advanced 
cybersecurity 
certification 
training 
program, or 
as a Certified 
Ethical 
Hacker, or on 
your own) (2)  
          
End of Block: Prior Experience Block  
Start of Block: Extent of Use Block 
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EU.1 Indicate 
the extent to 
which you 
use each of 
the following 
items for the 
technology in 
your unit: 
Extensively 
(1) A lot (2) 
A moderate 
amount (3) A little (4) 
None at all 
(5) 
Network 
activity 
logging 
mechanisms 
to monitor 
network 
activity? (1)  
          
Intrusion 
Detection 
Systems 
(IDS) and/or 
Intrusion 
Prevention 
Systems 
(IPS) on your 
network? (2)  
          
Sensor 
deployments 
and/or traffic 
analyzers for 
your 
network? (3)  
          
Physical 
controls to 
prevent 
unauthorized 
physical 
access to 
network and 
server 
resources? (4)  
          
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Locked 
rooms and/or 
server 
cabinets to 
secure servers 
or other vital 
computer 
resources? (5)  
          
Computers 
with a locked 
BIOS or 
some other 
way to make 
the computer 
impossible to 
boot from an 
external 
device? (6)  
          
Computers 
with 
encrypted 
hard drives? 
(7)  
          
Servers or 
other vital 
computers 
with 
encrypted 
hard drives? 
(8)  
          
Strong 
password 
requirements 
to prevent 
unauthorized 
user access? 
(9)  
          
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Computers 
that are 
protected 
with antivirus 
software? 
(10)  
          
Computers 
that are 
protected 
with anti-
malware 
software? 
(11)  
          
Computers 
that are 
protected by 
one or more 
firewalls? 
(12)  
          
Regular 
backups of 
servers or 
other vital 
computers 
that are then 
kept offline? 
(13)  
          
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EU.2 
Indicate the 
frequency 
for which 
each of 
following 
items is true 
for the 
technology 
in your unit: 
Very 
frequently 
(1) 
Frequently 
(2) 
Periodically 
(3) 
Seldom 
(4) 
Never 
(5) 
You monitor 
general 
network 
activity logs 
for signs of 
suspicious 
network 
activity? (1)  
          
You check 
the probing 
and/or block 
reports from 
any 
Intrusion 
Detection 
Systems 
(IDS) and/or 
Intrusion 
Prevention 
Systems 
(IPS) on 
your 
network? (2)  
          
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You analyze 
reports or 
data from a 
sensor 
deployment 
(e.g., 
honeypots, 
traffic 
analyzers 
other than 
your 
IDS/IPS, 
etc.) for 
your 
network? (3)  
          
You control 
unauthorized 
access to 
server and 
network 
resources? 
(4)  
          
You require 
authorized 
users to 
change their 
passwords? 
(5)  
          
You update 
antivirus 
definitions 
for the 
computers in 
your school 
or 
department? 
(6)  
          
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You update 
the anti-
malware 
settings to 
reflect 
current or 
emerging 
threats? (7)  
          
You update 
the firewall 
settings to 
reflect 
current or 
emerging 
threats? (8)  
          
You update 
the firewall 
setting to 
allow 
approved 
applications 
to access the 
network? (9)  
          
You run 
critical 
software and 
operating 
system 
updates on 
computers? 
(10)  
          
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You back up 
servers or 
vital 
computer 
resources 
according to 
a backup 
policy that 
requires 
offline 
storage of 
backups? 
(11)  
          
End of Block: Extent of Use Block  
Start of Block: Education Block 
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ED.1 Indicate 
the extent to 
which you 
feel that the 
user 
community 
you support 
is educated 
about the 
following 
items related 
to 
information 
security: 
Extensively 
(1) A lot (2) 
A moderate 
amount (3) A little (4) 
None at all 
(5) 
The need to 
update their 
work 
computer's 
operating 
system and/or 
applications 
whenever a 
new update 
becomes 
available? (1)  
          
The need to 
update their 
antivirus 
definitions 
whenever a 
new update 
becomes 
available? (2)  
          
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The need to 
exercise 
caution when 
using USB 
drives or 
external hard 
drives, which 
they have 
previously 
used outside 
the 
workplace, on 
a work 
computer? (3)  
          
The need to 
exercise 
caution when 
downloading 
or installing 
software or 
apps from 
third-party 
sources onto 
their work 
computers? 
(4)  
          
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The need to 
exercise 
caution when 
engaging in 
conversations 
that could 
divulge 
sensitive 
information 
to 
unauthorized 
personnel, 
such as is 
common in 
social-
engineering 
type 
situations? 
(5)  
          
The need to 
exercise 
caution when 
opening 
email 
attachments 
and clickable 
links in 
email? (6)  
          
End of Block: Education Block  
Start of Block: Perceived Awareness Block 
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PA.1 Rate 
your level 
of 
knowledge 
for each of 
the 
following 
items for 
the 
technology 
in your 
unit: 
Extremely 
knowledgeabl
e (1) 
Somewhat 
knowledgeabl
e (2) 
Moderately 
knowledgeabl
e (3) 
Somewhat 
not 
knowledgeabl
e (4) 
Not 
knowledgeabl
e at all (5) 
The volume 
and type of 
network 
traffic that 
takes place 
on your 
network? 
(1)  
          
The nature 
and type of 
network 
traffic on 
any 
networks 
that 
connect 
with yours? 
(2)  
          
The 
vulnerabilit
y of your 
computers 
and 
network 
equipment 
to a 
cyberattack
? (3)  
          
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The 
physical 
design and 
layout of 
your 
network? 
(4)  
          
The type of 
defensive 
measures 
that are 
currently 
protecting 
your 
network? 
(5)  
          
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PA.2 Rate 
your level of 
awareness for 
each of the 
following 
items 
regarding the 
technology in 
your unit: 
Extremely 
aware (1) 
Somewhat 
aware (2) 
Neither 
aware nor 
unaware (3) 
Somewhat 
unaware (4) 
Extremely 
unaware (5) 
The type of 
network 
traffic on 
your 
department 
network? (1)  
          
The network 
traffic on any 
intersecting 
networks? (2)  
          
The number 
and severity 
of potential 
vulnerabilities 
on your 
network? (3)  
          
The overall 
physical 
infrastructure 
of your 
network? (4)  
          
The defensive 
measures that 
protect your 
network? (5)  
          
End of Block: Perceived Awareness Block  
Start of Block: Perceived Readiness Block 
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PR.1 Rate 
your ability 
in relation to 
each of the 
following 
items for the 
technology in 
your unit: 
Extremely 
able (1) 
Somewhat 
able (2) 
Moderately 
able (3) 
Somewhat 
not able (4) 
Not able at 
all (5) 
To detect 
whether a 
computer or 
network 
resource has 
been 
compromised 
by malware? 
(1)  
          
To detect 
whether a 
computer or 
network 
resource is 
being used in 
support of an 
illegal 
activity such 
as a 
Distributed 
Denial of 
Service 
(DDoS) 
attack? (2)  
          
To prevent a 
cyberattack 
from stealing 
sensitive 
information 
from any 
computer or 
network 
resource? (3)  
          
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To prevent a 
ransom ware 
attack from 
encrypting 
servers or 
sensitive data 
resources? (4)  
          
To recover 
users’ access 
to vital 
computer 
resources in 
the event of a 
ransom ware 
attack 
without 
paying the 
ransom? (5)  
          
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PR.2 Rate 
your 
readiness to 
address each 
of the 
following for 
the 
equipment in 
your school 
or 
department: 
Extremely 
ready (1) 
Somewhat 
ready (2) 
Neither ready 
nor not ready 
(3) 
Somewhat 
not ready (4) 
Not ready at 
all (5) 
To detect 
whether a 
computer or 
network 
resource has 
been hacked? 
(1)  
          
To prevent a 
ransom ware 
attack from 
limiting 
users’ ability 
to access data 
resources? 
(2)  
          
To prevent a 
ransom ware 
attack from 
encrypting 
servers or 
sensitive data 
resources 
such as data 
that falls 
under 
FERPA or 
HIPPA 
regulations? 
(3)  
          
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To recover 
data 
resources 
after they 
have been 
fully or 
partially 
erased by a 
computer 
virus? (4)  
          
To recover 
data 
resources 
after they 
have been 
encrypted by 
a ransom 
ware? (5)  
          
End of Block: Perceived Readiness Block   
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